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Abstract

The Air Force's dependence on the Internet continues to increase daily. The
Internet has become a staple of the office environment along side the telephone, the fax
machine, and the computer. However, this increased dependence comes with risks.
The popularity and potential of the Internet attracts users with illegal as well as legal
intentions. Since the Air Force considers the Internet an integral component of its
Information Operations strategy, the Air Force must be confident that it can trust the
security of this component. Therefore, reliable methods and information that helps the
Air Force classify the risks associated with the Internet can help the Air Force determine
the best processes to assure the security of its use of this resource.
This thesis examines the computer and network attack taxonomies developed by
John Howard. Howard developed the taxonomy to help him classify Internet security
incidents as part of his doctoral research and as part of a follow-on project to develop a
common language for computer security. The taxonomy is a possible method that the
Air Force can use to help it classify Internet security attacks and incidents.
This researcher concluded that the computer and network attack taxonomies
were satisfactory. The questionnaire respondents appeared to prefer the 1998 version
more. In addition, this study offers several areas of improvement to the taxonomy that
can help it become more widely accepted. This researcher also concluded that
organizations responsible for the collection and distribution of Internet security
information, do explicitly collect some, but not all, information useful as input into the
taxonomy.

IX

AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMPUTER AND NETWORK ATTACK TAXONOMY

I. Introduction

The Internet
Nothing great was ever achieved without enthusiasm. Ralph Waldo
Emerson (qtd. in Bartlett, 1980:497)
In 1957, the Soviet Union shocked the US with its launch of the Sputnik satellite.
This event convinced many in the US that despite its success during World War II and its
newfound position as the world leader, the US had lost its footing to the Soviet Union.
Therefore, in 1958 "Congress created the National Defense Education Act [...] essential
for the training of tomorrow's scientists" (Moschovitis, 1999:34). This act resulted in the
creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in 1958. ARPA, with
millions in government funds, led the research and development of computers and
information processing, to include the concept of "connecting computers across long
distances" (Ibid.).
By 1968, ARPA had become one of the premier research agencies in the world,
and a central point of contact for anyone doing research concerning communications,
computers, or information processing. However, sharing research information with all
these interested parties was still an arduous task, since the US Postal Service was still
the primary means used to transfer information from one area to another. This desire to
find a better way to share information lead to ARPA's goal of connecting computers
across long distances to allow the sharing of information. ARPA's breakthrough

occurred when it submitted requests for proposals to build Interface Message
Processors (IMP) that would "connect the individual sites, route messages, scan for
errors, and confirm the arrival of messages at their destinations" (Moschovitis, 1999:61).
These IMPs became the building blocks for today's computer networks, and ultimately
the Internet.
The birth of ARPAnet, which eventually became the Internet, occurred around
September 1, 1969, in the shadow of the July 20,1969 lunar landing. ARPA
successfully networked IMPs located at the University of California at Los Angeles, the
University of California at Santa Barbara, the University of Utah, and the Stanford
Research Institute, thereby establishing the "foundation for advanced networking and
breaks a path toward the Internet" (Moschovitis, 1999:61). However, this technological
achievement received little fanfare, since the world still reveled in the lunar landing that
occurred a few months earlier.
ARPA maintained control of the Internet for the next 20 years, with the DOD,
research centers, and universities around the country as its primary users. In 1986, the
National Science Foundation (NSF) expanded the ARPAnet by developing a network
that allowed non-defense related users to be connected to the Internet (Moschovitis,
1999:125). The NSFnet dramatically increased the private sector's access to, and use
of the Internet. The Internet community had grown beyond the wildest dreams of its
developer, ARPA, and its maintainer, the US government. In an effort to keep pace with
the demands on its use and to integrate evolving technology into the Internet, ARPA
decommissioned ARPAnet in 1990, removed its original nodes from the Internet, and rerouted all traffic to the more robust and modern NSFnet backbone, maintained by the
Michigan Educational Research Information Triad (MERIT), IBM and MCI (Abbate,
1999:196).

The NSFnet backbone opened Internet access to the commercial world. As the
number of commercial users increased, so did the various types of uses of the Internet.
The DOD, research centers, and universities quickly saw their exclusivity on the Internet
disappear, as communications companies, computer companies, cutting edge
businesses, entrepreneurs, and the public began getting connected. Although the US
government still maintained control over the Internet, via the NSF, it began to encounter
difficulty in maintaining the Internet in response to its growing user community.
Therefore, the NSF relinquished control of the Internet to better facilitate the integration
of new technologies. In 1994, the NSF issued a plan that would allow competitive
Internet Service Providers (ISP) to operate their Internet service backbone and provide
access to the public. These commercial backbones eventually became the replacement
for NSFnet, thereby privatizing and commercializing the entire Internet. "On 30 April
1995, MERIT formally terminated the old NSFnet backbone, ending the US government
ownership of the Internet" (Abbate, 1999:199). However, the Air Force's dependence on
the Internet did not diminish due to its privatization and commercialization. In fact, it
increased, along with the world's desire to be connected.
My January 1999, the US military had approximately one million hosts connected
to the Internet (Moschovitis, 1999:278). A host is "any computer on a network that is a
repository for services available to other computers on the network" (Department of the
Air Force, AFDIR33-303, 1999:37). Describing the Air Force's increasing numbers of
hosts connected to the Internet as extraordinary, may be extreme, however in relation to
the growth of the Internet itself, it is not. Using phenomenal to describe the Internet may
be an understatement, but it does capture the essence as represented by Figure 1:
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(ISC, Internet Domain Survey: July 2000, 2000)
Figure 1 - Growth of Internet via Number of Hosts Connected
In addition, the Internet phenomenon expands well beyond the US borders.
Originally designed to meet the needs of the DOD, the Internet now supports users from
around the world. The Information Age indicator, Internet hosts per 10,000 people, of
the World Development Indicators (WDI) 1999, clearly illustrates this expansion. Figure
2 graphically illustrates this data point.
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Figure 2 - Internet Hosts per 10,000 People (Top Five Countries), as of July 1998

Of course, the primary access method to the Internet, personal computers, experienced
phenomenal growth to match the growth of the Internet. Once again, the Information
Age indicator of the World Development Indicators 1999 clearly illustrates the extremely
large number of personal computers worldwide. Figure 3 graphically illustrates this data
point.
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Figure 3 - Personal Computers per 1,000 People (Top Five Countries), as of 1998
The Internet provides seamless connectivity to networks throughout most of the
developed world, continues to grow at a phenomenal rate, and is the heart and soul of
the information technology era. However, it does not come without risk. John M.
Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence Agency, stated this quite succinctly in his
1996 testimony to the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, "I, like many others in this room, am concerned that
this connectivity and dependency make us vulnerable to a variety of information warfare
attacks" (Deutch, 1996).

Information Superiority
Information has long been an integral component of human competitionthose with a superior ability to gather, understand, control, and use
information have had a substantial advantage on the battlefield.
(Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:i)

The importance of information to warfighting led the Air Force to the realization
that information is a crucial offensive and defensive resource. Along with land, sea, air,
and space operations, information operations (IO) now constitutes the "fifth dimension of
warfare" (Fogleman, 1995). In recognition of this distinction, the Air Force identified
information superiority as a core competency. Information superiority is "the degree of
dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect,
control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition" (Department of the
Air Force, AFDD 2-5,1998:2). The Air Force explicitly stated its commitment to
information superiority by stating, "while Information Superiority is not the Air Force's
sole domain, it is, and will remain, an Air Force core competency" (Department of the Air
Force, Global, 1996). Figure 4 illustrates how the Air Force envisions the integrated
components of information superiority:

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
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Attack
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Electronic Protection
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(Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:3)
Figure 4 - Air Force Information Superiority Construct
To successfully deploy a superiority strategy, Sun Tzu identified the following
"prerequisites for combat commanders" (Huang, 1993:66):
•
•
•
•

Plan, but know the calculation of gains and losses
Mobilize, but know the causes for action and inaction
Control, but know lethal and safe terrains
Fight, but know where there are sufficiencies and deficiencies

Since the Air Force considers IO a new dimension of war, and plans to implement an
information superiority strategy, these prerequisites should apply. Unfortunately, the
lack of quantifiable, repeatable method of describing Internet security risks in relation to
these prerequisites appears to be a weak link in Air Force's information superiority

strategy. Without this information, how can the Air Force effectively plan, mobilize,
control, and fight in this new dimension?
To add to this weak link, the Air Force knows its adversaries are also working on
10 strategies. According to Dr. Wess Roberts, author of Leadership Secrets of Attila the
Hun, commanders should "not underestimate the power of an enemy, no matter how
great or small, to rise against you on another day" (Roberts, 1985:58). The Air Force
holds commanders accountable for the posture and execution of Defensive
Counterinformation (DCI) within their commands. DCI "includes those actions that
protect information, information systems, and information operations from any potential
adversary" (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5,1998:10). Unfortunately, the free
flowing nature of the Internet, added to the changing face of the threats, make
commanders' jobs even harder. As stated in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5
Information Operations (AFDD 2-5), "terrorists, criminals, and hackers are becoming
more of a threat as they discover the benefits of using the electronic environment to
accomplish their goals" (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:6).

The Problem
My greatest concern is that hackers, terrorist organizations, or other
nations might use information warfare techniques as part of a coordinated
attack designed to seriously disrupt:
•
•
•

Infrastructures such as electric power distribution, air traffic
control, or financial sectors;
International commerce; and
Deployed military forces in time of peace or war. (Deutch, 1996)

Mr. Deutch's words are very relevant today. As the Air Force's dependence on
the Internet continues to grow, so do concerns about Internet security. Global
Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, which is part of the National

Security Strategy, contains these unambiguous words in reference to the information
superiority core competency:
Information Operations, and Information Warfare (IW) in particular, will grow
in importance during the 21st Century. The Air Force will aggressively
expand its efforts in defensive IW as it continues to develop its offensive IW
capabilities. The top IW priority is to defend our own increasingly
information-intensive capabilities [...] on the offensive side, the Air Force
will emphasize operational and tactical IW and continue, in conjunction with
other Federal agencies, to support strategic information operations.
(Department of the Air Force, Global Engagement, 1996)
The Air Force provides even more reasons to develop a reliable, repeatable process to
classify Internet security incidents because of its goal for Internet use within the service.
According to the Air Force Instruction 33-129 Transmission of Information via the
Internet, "the Air Force goal for the Internet is to provide maximum availability at
acceptable risk levels for Air Force members needing access for the execution of official
business" (Department of the Air Force, AFI33-129, 1999:3). Therefore, developing a
process to classify Internet security incidents must advance beyond scientific guesses.
The Air Force should support and encourage sound research to ensure it, as well as its
members, recognizes Internet security incidents and can classify them accordingly.
In 1997, John D. Howard submitted his dissertation, An Analysis of Security
Incidents on the Internet 1989 - 1996, to Carnegie Mellon University as part of his
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Engineering and Public Policy.
Howard explained that he was curious about the Internet and its security because many
reputable people had stated that the Internet, although wondrous, was very insecure and
dangerous. Yet, it was hard to find quantifiable evidence to support this fact. Thus,
Howard began his research based on the premise:
Security is a problem on the Internet. The thousands of successful breakins over the years are a testimony to that. But just how much of a problem
is it? The answer to this question is important for two reasons. First, with
information about Internet security problems, we could determine to what

extent, and in what areas, government programs and policies should be
instituted to devote society's resources to protecting the Internet. Second,
trends over time could be used to determine the effectiveness of these
policies and resources. (Howard, Analysis, 1997:1)
However, as Howard embarked on his research, he discovered that although many lists
of terms, lists of categories, tables, matrices, and taxonomies existed focusing on
computer and network attacks, they proved inadequate for his needs. According to
Howard:
The taxonomy developed as part of this research is broader in scope than
Landwher, et al., because it does not attempt to enumerate all computer
security flaws, or to enumerate all possible methods of attack, but rather
attempts to provide a broad, inclusive framework. The intention was to
reorient the focus of the taxonomy toward a process, rather than a single
classification category, in order to provide both an adequate classification
scheme for Internet attacks, and also a taxonomy that would aid in thinking
about computer and network security. (Howard, Analysis, 1997:60)
Eventually, Howard developed his computer and network attack taxonomy shown in
Figure 5.
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Figure 5 -1997 Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy
Although Howard's taxonomy focused on attacks, he subsequently used his
taxonomy to classify incidents during his study. He defined attacks as "a single
unauthorized access attempt, or unauthorized use attempt, regardless of success"

10

(Howard, Analysis, 1997:287) and defined incidents as "a group of attacks that can be
distinguished from other incidents because of the distinctiveness of the attackers, and
the degree of similarity of sites, techniques, and timing" (lbid.:289). However, more
important is that the taxonomy was developed from:
[...] a process or operational viewpoint. From this viewpoint, an attacker on
computers or networks attempts to link to ultimate objectives or motivations.
This link is established through an operational sequence of tools, access,
and results that connects these attackers to their objectives [...] (Ibid.:71)
Therefore, Howard's taxonomy is more than a listing of information, its attempts to
describe the process of computer and network attacks.
Approximately one year after publishing his dissertation containing the original
computer and network attack taxonomy, Howard and Longstaff published a new version,
illustrated in Figure 6, in the 1998 Sandia National Laboratories Report titled A Common
Language for Computer Security Incidents. According to Howard and Longstaff:
Finally, it is hoped that by demonstrating the utility of this particular
representation for incident data, other response teams could structure
incident in the same taxonomy, facilitating the sharing of information and
allowing a more complete and accurate analysis of security incidents
across a wider range of victimized sites. (Howard and Longstaff, 1998:19)
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Figure 6 -1998 Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy, 1998
This thesis examines the computer and network attack taxonomies developed by
Howard. Howard developed the taxonomies to help him classify Internet security attacks
and incidents as part of his doctoral research and as part of a follow-on project to help
develop a common language for the computer security. A resulting recommendation
included continued evaluation of the computer and network taxonomies to make
practical modifications. This continued evaluation may lead to its wider acceptance by
the Internet security community, as well as maintain the taxonomies' currency due to the
dynamic nature of the Internet. In addition, this analysis exposes the Air Force to a
possibly better method to classify Internet security attacks and incidents. Finally, this
thesis adds to the body of knowledge with respect to Internet security and other related
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disciplines, such as computer security, information security, communication security,
information assurance, and information warfare.

Research Overview
The remaining chapters of this thesis provide the details of this research.
Chapter II contains the literature review, which explores the existing body of knowledge
pertinent to this research topic. Chapter III describes the method used and assumptions
made while analyzing the data. Chapter IV provides the findings of the analysis
performed on the data. Finally, Chapter V discusses the findings, presents conclusions,
and makes recommendations for further research in this area.
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II. Literature Review

If it keeps up, man will atrophy all his limbs but the push-button finger.
Frank Lloyd Wright (qtd. in Quoteland.com, 2000)

The Internet and Society
As indicated by Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3, the phenomenal growth of the
Internet means that people, states, and countries believe in this information technology
resource. The Internet, the information superhighway, provides the backbone for the
electronic exchange of information around the world, with the US being a major user and
developer. According to the Science & Engineering Indicators - 2000 compiled by the
National Science Board (NSB), "the revolution in information technology (IT) has been
likened to the industrial revolution in terms of its potential scope" (NSB, 2000:9-4). The
NSB is:
Responsible, by law, for developing on a biennial basis, a report"[...] on
indicators of the state of science and engineering in the United States."
The Science and Engineering Indicators series was designed to provide a
broad base of quantitative information about U.S. science, engineering, and
technology for use by public and private policymakers. (NSB, 2000:xiv;
NSF, 2000)
The NSB recognized the impact of IT to American society and dedicated an entire
chapter of the Science & Engineering Indicators - 2000 to the subject.
The NSB defined IT as an integration of "three key technologies: digital
computing, data storage, and the ability to transmit digital signals through
telecommunications networks" (NSB, 2000:9-5). The statistics generated by the NSB
gives credibility to the existence of an IT revolution. The NSB clearly states that:
The U.S. economy approaches the end of the 20th century with
unprecedented real growth, miniscule inflation, low un-employment, and
strong consumer and investor confidence. Economists have dubbed it the
"Cinderella economy." The reasons for this success are many and varied.
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However, it can be argued that technological change has been behind the
economic boom of the late 1990s. (NSB, 2000:2-6)
The NSB broadened the scope of IT by using the term high technology, as defined by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD
contains 29 member countries, which includes the US, and is "an organisation that, most
importantly, provides governments a setting in which to discuss, develop and perfect
economic and social policy" (OECD, 2000). The OECD identified four industries as high
technology based on their research and development (R&D) intensities: aerospace,
computers and office machinery, electronics-communications, and pharmaceuticals"
(NSB, 2000:7-4; Sakurai, Evangelos, and Papaconstantinou 1996:38).
Percent
100

High-technology
manufacturing
industries

Knowledge-based
service industries

Other
manufacturing
industries

(NSB, 2000:7-6)
Figure 7 - Avg. Annual Rates of Growth in Three U.S. Economic Sectors: 1980 - 97
This high technology sector experienced the most growth during the past two decades,
as illustrated by Figure 7. More importantly, three of the industries that comprise high
technology, aerospace, computers and office machinery, and electronicscommunications, play substantial roles in the defense industry.
Figure 8 illustrates more vividly the influence high technology industries have on
the current US economic boom. Venture capital firms invested $16.8 billion dollars in
1998. High technology firms that developed computer software or offered software
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services garnered top billing by receiving 33 percent of the investments.
Telecommunications firms were second, receiving 17 percent of the investments (NSB,
2000:7-3).
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(NSB, 2000:7-25)
Figure 8 - U.S. Venture Capital Disbursements, By Industry Category: 1988 & 1999
In short, the Science & Engineering Indicators - 2000 clearly illustrate that:
The United States continues to lead or be among the leaders in all major
technology areas. Advancements in information technologies (computers
and telecommunications products) continue to influence new technology
development and to dominate technical exchanges between the United
States and its trading partners. (NSB, 2000:7-3)
The NSB provided a more succinct comment on the impact of information technology,
"information technology has had an impact on virtually all sectors of our economy and
society, including the conduct of research, as well as our daily lives" (NSB, 2000:1-39).
The economic status of the US clearly shows that high technology industries
played a major role in the current economic boom. Yet, they do not indicate the role the
Internet played. The term Internet is a "catch-all term used to describe the massive
worldwide network of computers. Literally it means network of networks, and is a
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worldwide interconnection of individual networks operated by government, industry,
academia, and private sectors" (Department of the Air Force, AFDIR33-303, 1999:105).
Due to the nebulous nature of the Internet, quantifying its role in the current economic
boom is difficult. However, the NSB does predict that:
Technological change is expected to continue to transform many aspects of
economic production, distribution, and consumption. Such changes
include, for example, further development of Internet commerce (e.g.,
banking and retail operations), additional advances in biotechnology (e.g.,
"designer" drugs), greater automation in production (e.g., advanced robotic
systems), new forms of household entertainment (e.g., digital video disc
entertainment systems), and new ways of conducting scientific research
itself (e.g., the creation of virtual laboratories). (NSB, 2000:2-6)
Consequently, if indicators show that high technology is the juggernaut behind the US'
current economic boom, to include the Internet, then analyzing Internet security to
maintain society's confidence in this technology such be of utmost importance. Part of
this analysis includes the ability to clearly and consistently identify security issues and
threats.
Although the statistics referenced thus far provide a telling story on the impact of
the Internet in the US, the statistics derived from the population at large provides a more
breathtaking picture. The NSB documented several Internet related trends, which
includes:
•

Internet-based electronic commerce is growing rapidly and changing the
impact of IT on the economy. Private market research firms estimated
that the value of transactions conducted over the Internet will reach $1
trillion by 2003 (up from $40-100 billion in 1998). (NSB, 2000:9-3)

•

Schools are rapidly connecting to the Internet. By 1998, 89 percent of
public schools were connected to the Internet (up from 35 percent in
1994). (Ibid.:93)

•

Colleges are increasingly using IT in instructions. The percentage of
college courses using e-mail, Internet resources, class Web pages, and
other forms of information technology in instruction increased rapidly
between 1994 and 1998. (Ibid.:93)
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•

Governments around the world are using the Internet and the World Wide
Web to communicate with constituencies. ((Ibid.:93)

Additional trends clearly indicate that US citizens consider the Internet a staple
ingredient in their homes and work centers. For example, "the number of people without
access to a computer either at home or at work fell substantially between 1983 and
1999_fr0m 70 percent down to 34 percent" (NSB, 2000:8-2). Furthermore, the
increased access to computers in homes and work centers also increased Internet and
computer usage, as illustrated in Figure 9.
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Figure 9 - Computer Usage: Average Hours Per Year: 1995,1997,1999
The Internet, without doubt, plays an important role for many Americans. It may
be difficult to quantify its importance, however the Science & Engineering Indicators 2000 implies that it is very important:
•
•

In 1999, for the first time ever, a majority (54 percent) of American adults
had at least one computer in their homes. (NSB, 2000:8-2)
Approximately one-third of Americans subscribed to an on-line service
and had home e-mail addresses in 1999. (lbid.:8-2)
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Since American society places such a high value on access to the Internet, Internet
security has inevitably become important too. Along that line, since the DOD protects
and defends the US from all enemies, foreign and domestic, the DOD must address
Internet security since it has now become a valued domestic resource. More
specifically, the Air Force must address Internet security since the Air Force considers
the Internet a valued resource too, as it continues to integrate the Internet into its daily
worldwide operations.

The Internet and the Air Force
According to Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, the postCold War Air Force considers "information as a weapon/target" (Department of the Air
Force, Global Engagement, 1996). The Air Force considers information such a valuable
weapon/target, that it added information superiority as a core competency. The Air
Force stated:
Today, more than ever, gaining and maintaining information superiority is a
critical task for commanders and an important step in executing the
remaining Air Force core competencies. The execution of information
operations in air, space, and, increasingly, in "cyberspace" constitutes the
means by which the Air Force does its part to provide information
superiority to the nation, joint force commander, and Service component
and coalition forces. (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5,1998:i)
The Air Force's belief in information superiority resulted in it developing its own
construct, as illustrated in Figure 4, to pursue, achieve, and integrate information
superiority into other aspects of the Air Force environment.
Although the Air Force Information Superiority Construct explicitly affects the Air
Force's information systems, the Air Force realizes that the information infrastructure
"transcends industry, the media, and the military and includes both government and
nongovernment entities" (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:4). The term
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information infrastructure refers to the link between "individual information systems
through numerous and redundant direct and indirect paths, including space-based
systems" (lbid.:4). These redundant direct and indirect paths include the Internet. The
Air Force more narrowly defines the components of the Internet that supports its mission
as the Defense Information Infrastructure (DM), the National Information Infrastructure
(Nil), and the Global Information Infrastructure (Gil).
The Dll is:
The web of communications networks, computers, software, databases,
applications, and other services that meet the information processing and
transport needs of DOD users, across the range of military operations. The
Dll includes the information infrastructure of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Defense agencies, and the combatant commands. It provides
information processing and services to subscribers over the Defense
Information System Network and includes command and control, tactical,
intelligence, and commercial communications systems used to transmit
DOD information. The Dll is embedded within and deeply integrated into
the National Information Infrastructure. Their seamless relationship makes
distinguishing between them difficult. (Department of the Air Force, AFDIR
33-303, 1999:75)
The Dll transcends the US military and civilian sectors, which is a compelling reason to
why analyzing Internet security activity is so important. How does this compare to the
Nil?
The Nil is:
The nationwide interconnection of communications networks, computers,
databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of
information available to users. The Nil encompasses a wide range of
communications and information equipment, systems, and networks,
including the personnel who make decisions and handle the transmitted
information. The Nil is similar in nature and purpose to the Global
Information Infrastructure but relates in scope only to a national information
environment, which includes all government and civilian information
infrastructures. (Department of the Air Force, AFDIR 33-303, 1999:119120)
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Similar to the DM, the Nil's definition reiterates the tight coupling of the government and
public information resources. The interrelationship between the DM and Nil leads to the
next level of information infrastructure integration, the Gil.
The Gil is:
The worldwide interconnection of communications networks, computers,
databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of
information available to users. It encompasses a wide range of
communications and information equipment, systems, and networks, to
include the personnel who make decisions and handle the transmitted
information. (Department of the Air Force, AFDIR 33-303,1999:94)
The DM definition uses the word web as a metaphor for the interconnectivity provided by
the Internet. The Nil and Gil actually include interconnection within their definition,
which also refers to the Internet. Therefore, the Internet, from the Air Force's
perspective, consists of the interconnected Dll, Nil, and Gil, as illustrated in Figure 10.
These information infrastructures provide the worldwide connectivity used by the Air
Force to accomplish its mission.
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Figure 10 - DM, Nil, and Gil Interfaces
An insecure Internet as illustrated by Figure 10, poses a threat to the Air Force.
AFDD 2-5 provided the following description of the interaction between the Dll, Nil, and
Gil:
In reality, a news broadcast, a diplomatic communique, and a military
message ordering the execution of an operation all depend on the Gil.
(Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:5)
Therefore, any breach of security, any vulnerability that an adversary can use to its
advantage to disrupt or taint this order, can cause untold damage to the US and its
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Allies. Thus, analyzing Internet security incidents to clearly and consistently identify
threats gain importance as the Air Force becomes more dependent on the Internet.
Information systems and the Internet provide a new dimension of warfare for the
Air Force. It provides a mechanism and equalizer for our adversaries too, especially the
less advanced and wealthy, to take action against the US. For the cost of a personal
computer and Internet access, along with the desire and the technological knowledge,
advisories worldwide can exploit known Internet vulnerabilities to harm the US, as
illustrated in Figure 11:

(JCS, 1998:1-16)
Figure 11 - Emerging IO and Technology
The Air Force voiced its concerns about this issue by stating:
Just as the United States plans to employ IO against its adversaries, so
too can it expect adversaries to reciprocate. Numerous countries have
discovered the benefits of IO. They employ psychological operations
(PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and military deception and now are
collecting available intelligence via the Internet and creating malicious
code and hacking cells. Terrorists, criminals, and hackers are becoming
more of a threat as they discover the benefits of using the electronic
environment to accomplish their goals. (Department of the Air Force,
AFDD 2-5, 1998:6)
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The Air Force should be concerned about these threats, since the Dll, Nil, and Gil all
represent portions of the Internet.
These threats continue to concern the Air Force. Table 1 lists threats that the Air
Force believes pose risks to systems that rely on information technology. These threats
pose risks for "both stand-alone and networked weapon and support systems [...] these
threats can be employed by both organized entities, such as nation-states, and
unstructured threats, such as rogue computer hackers" (Department of the Air Force,
AFDD 2-5, 1998:7).
Table 1 - Information Warfare Threats
•
•
•
•
•
•

Compromise
Malicious Code
System
Intrusion
Psychological
Ops
Intel Collection
Technology
Transfer
Software Bugs

Deception/ Corruption
• Malicious Code
• System Intrusion
• Military Deception
• Spoofing
• Imitation

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Denial/Loss
Malicious Code
Bombs
Directed Energy
Weapons
Lasers
Physical Attack
Nuclear & Nonnuclear EMP
Chemical/
Biological
Warfare

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Destruction
System
Intrusion
Lasers
Physical Attack
Nuclear & Nonnuclear EMP
Virus Insertion
System
Overload
Radio
Frequency
Jamming

(Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:6)
Once again, the information warfare threats do not explicitly mention the Internet,
however the many of the information warfare threats can occur via the Internet.
The risks posed by the information warfare threats provide enough motivation to
develop a process to clearly and consistently classify Internet security attacks and
incidents. According to Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century:
Information Operations, and Information Warfare (IW) in particular, will grow
in importance during the 21st Century. The Air Force will aggressively
expand its efforts in defensive IW as it continues to develop its offensive IW
capabilities. The top IW priority is to defend our own increasingly
information-intensive capabilities.
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Nevertheless, the Air Force provides another motivator with respect to its focus on
defensive counterinformation (DCI). DCI includes information assurance, operational
security, counterdeception, counterintelligence, counterpsychological operations, and
electronic protection. According to AFDD 2-5, "DCI is the Air Force's overall top priority
within the information warfare arena. Commanders are accountable for DCI posture and
execution within their commands" (Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-5, 1998:7).
Therefore, this statement implies that Internet security should also be a top priority not
only for the Air Force generally, but for Air Force commanders specifically. As such,
being able to clearly and consistently identify the threats to Air Force information and
information systems is a necessity.
As the Air Force continues to integrate its daily operations with the Internet,
analyzing Internet security incidents becomes more important. The Air Force Research
Laboratory in Rome, New York recently announced its participation in the DOD's $50
million research project of the Next Generation Internet (NGI). In his explanation of the
purpose of the NGI, Secretary of Defense William Cohen reiterated the importance of
the Internet to the military and the public:
"Internet technology was first demonstrated by the military in the 1970s and
is the foundation of today's military and commercial network systems," said
Secretary of Defense William Cohen. "The military must stay ahead in
information technologies to dominate in the future. The Next Generation
Internet program will enable revolutionary capabilities of importance to both
the Department of Defense and the nation as a whole." (AFN, AFRL, 2000)
Therefore, analyzing Internet security incidents, with respect to the current technology,
will be helpful as the Air Force participates in the development of the NGI.
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The Research Agenda
Given the growing dependence upon the Internet by the American citizens in
general, and the Air Force in particular, the body of knowledge that addresses Internet
security remains small. To address this issue, which crosses the boundaries of several
areas of expertise, such as, computer and communications security, software
engineering, fault-tolerance, systems design and implementation, and networking,
among others, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the
National Security Agency (NSA) charted the Committee on Information Systems
Trustworthiness. DARPA and the NSA requested the committee to "examine, discuss,
and report on interrelated issues associated with the research, development, and
commercialization of technologies for trustworthy systems and to use its assessment to
develop recommendations for research to enhance information systems trustworthiness"
(Schneider, et al, 1999:viii). The committee included experts from the previously listed
areas of expertise, as well as the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board,
the Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications, and the National
Research Council; a who's who in information technology and research.
The Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness focused on networked
information systems (NIS). The Committee defined NIS as integrated "computing
systems, communications systems, people (both as users and operations); procedures,
and more" (Schneider, et al, 1999:2). It also defined trustworthiness as:
Assurance that a system deserves to be trusted—that it will perform as
expected despite environmental disruptions, human and operator error,
hostile attacks, and design and implementation errors. Trustworthy
systems reinforce the belief that they will continue to produce expected
behavior and will not be susceptible to subversion. (Ibid.:316)
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The primary NISs subjected to this study were the public telephone system (PTN) and
the Internet due to their extremely large size, dependence upon each other, society's
dependence upon the PTN, and society's growing dependence upon the Internet.
The committee openly admits that the title of their final report, Trust in
Cyberspace, is intentionally ambiguous. The report notes:
One reviewer, contemplating the present, suggested that a question mark
be placed at the end of the title to raise questions about the
trustworthiness of cyberspace today. And this is a question that the
report does raise. (Schneider, et al, 1999:viii)
Regardless of the interpretation of the title's meaning, one of the conclusions developed
by the committee was that more research is needed in this area. They offered several
conclusions and recommendations pertinent to this study, and future studies, into the
overarching area of information technology in their final report, published in 1999:
•

[...] absent scientific studies that measure dominant detractors of NIS
trustworthiness, it its hard to know what vulnerabilities are the most significant
or how resources might best be allocated in order to enhance a system's
trustworthiness. (Schneider, et al, 1999:15)

•

Rigorous empirical studies of systems outages and their causes are a
necessary ingredient of any research agenda intended to further NIS
trustworthiness. (Ibid.:15)

•

Security research during the past few decades has been based on formal
policy models that focus on protecting information from unauthorized access
by specifying which users should have access to data or other systems
objects. It is time to challenge this paradigm of "absolute security" and move
toward a model built on three axioms of insecurity: insecurity exists; insecurity
cannot be destroyed; and insecurity can be moved around. (Ibid.:247)

•

The premise of this report is that a "trust gap" is emerging between the
expectations of the public (along with parts of government) and the
capabilities of NISs. (Ibid.:21)

•

Hostile attacks are the fastest-growing source of NIS disturbances.
Indications are that this trend will continue and that, because they can be
coordinated attacks are potentially the most destabilizing form of
trustworthiness breach. (Ibid.:22)
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•

A few university computer science departments have several faculty
members who emphasize computer security research, but many departments
have none who do. In any event, the number of computer security
researchers is small compared to the number in other specialties [...].
(Ibid.:235).

•

DARPA is generally effective in its interactions with the research community,
but DARPA needs to increase its focus on information security and NIS
trustworthiness research, especially with regard to long-term efforts.
(Ibid.:254)

•

An increase in expenditures for research in information security and NIS
trustworthiness is warranted. (Ibid.:255)

As illustrated by the previous information, American society's dependence on the
Internet continues to grow, as well as Air Force's dependence. However, the scientific
and empirical research required identify and classify security issues continue to lag.
"Articulating an agenda for that research" (Schneider, et al, 1999:13) was a goal of the
Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness. Beneficiaries of this agenda
include researchers, policymakers, NIS operators, and product developers, all of whom
have a stake in the findings resulting from this research agenda.

The Reality of Internet Security Incidents
Given the growing dependence on the Internet and the lack of research focused
on Internet security activity, how can one determine the prevalence of Internet security
incidents? Due to national security concerns by the DOD and liability concerns of the
public, quantifying an answer remains elusive. However, by gleaning publicly accessible
resources, it certainly suggests that a problem exists. Table 2 provides some insight into
Internet security incidents. Obviously, the list is not all-inclusive. Nonetheless, it does
illustrate that all Internet users are potential victims of Internet security incidents and the
Air Force would not be the sole beneficiary of analyzing these events.

28

Table 2 ■ List of Publicly Known Internet Security Incidents
Internet Security
Incident
Air Force home page
hacked
Computer attacks

Computer based
crimes
Distributed-Denial-ofService (DDOS)
attacks on
commercial websites
Federal website
attacks and
vandalism
ILOVEYOU virus

Intrusions

10 attack

Melissa virus

Public posting of
computer hacker
tools
Ramstein Air Base,
Germany website
hacked
Solar Sunrise
incident
Use of Zombies
during DDOS attacks
Various hacker
intrusions

Description
Vandalism and data destruction

Source
(AFN, Hacker, 2000)

Numerous computer attacks via
the Internet against DOD
computer systems occur daily.
Various hacking, data mischief,
theft and copyright violations
occur via the Internet
Intentional attack on
commercial web sites that
denied access to legitimate
users and customers.
Vandalism, defacing, and
distributed-denial-of-service to
various Federal web sites
Destructive email virus that
does various damage to
infected computers
Various DOD computers victim
of unauthorized access
attempts
Speculation that the US
conducted 10 attacks against
Serbia and Kosovo during 78day war in 1999
Destructive macro virus that
affected Microsoft Word 2000
and Word 97.
The availability of computer
hacker tools on the Internet
continues to grow
Vandalism and defacing of
website

(GAO, T-AIMD-96-92, 1996)

Four days of hacker intrusions
into DOD computer systems
Hijack of commercial servers
which are then used to conduct
DDOS attacks
DOD computer systems victim
on continuous hacker attacks

(AFN, Theft, 2000)

(Abreu, 2000; Frank, 2000)

(GAO, T-AIMD-99-223, 1999)

(GAO, T-AIMD-00-171, 2000)

(AFN, DOD, 2000)

(Brewin, 1999)

(GAO, T-AIMD-99-146, 1999)

(GAO, T-AIMD-96-108, 1996)

(AFN, Hacker, 2000)

(United States Senate, 1998)
(Verton, 2000:10)

(GAO, AIMD-98-22, 1999)

In addition, three studies depict the realities of Internet security incidents
concerning the DOD, the AF, and the general population. These studies were the
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Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment
Program, the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) Computer Security
Assistance Program (CSAP), and the Howard study, An Analysis of Security Incidents
on the Internet 1989 - 1995.
GAP AIMD-96-84 Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of
Defense Pose Increasing Risk, published in 1996 and submitted to the US Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, reports on "the extent to which Defense computer
systems are being attacked, the actual and potential damage to its information and
systems, and the challenges Defense is facing in securing sensitive information" (GAO,
AIMD-96-84,1996:1). The report based its facts on DISA's Vulnerability Analysis and
Assessment Program, in which DISA personnel penetrated DOD computer systems via
the Internet, from 1992 through 1995. The report stated:
•
•
•
•
•

DISA conducted 38,000 total attacks
DISA successfully gained access to 24,700 target computers, or 65
percent
Total number of successful attacks detected, 988 or 4 percent
Total number of detected attacks reported, 267 or 27 percent
About 1 in 150 successful attacks drew an active defensive response
from the organizations being tested (GAO, AIMD-96-84,1996:19)

Figure 12 graphically illustrates the study's findings.
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Figure 12 - Results of DISA Vulnerability Assessments, 1992 -1995
With respect to the AFIWC CSAP study, Howard stated that the AFIWC study
was:
[...] a different study during 1995, the "security posture" of selected systems
at 15 Air Force bases was evaluated by the Air Force Information Warfare
Center (AFIWC), as part of their Computer Security Assistance Program
(CSAP) [...]. Of the 1,248 hosts attacked, 673 (54%) did not allow access.
Access was gained at the root level on 291 hosts (23%), and to the account
level on 284 hosts (23%). Of the 1,248 attacks, 156 were reported (13%),
which means that around 1 out of every 8 attacks resulted in a report.
(Howard, Analysis, 1997:175)
Figure 13 graphically illustrates the study's findings.
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Figure 13 - AFIWC 1995 CSAP Results
Finally, Howard "analyzed trends in Internet security through an investigation of
4,299 security-related incidents on the Internet reported to the Computer Emergency
Response Team Coordination Center (CERT®/CC) from 1989 to 1995" (CERT®/CC,
Analysis, 2001). The CERT®/CC is:
Located at the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a federally funded
research and development center at Carnegie Mellon University in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Following the Internet Worm incident, which
brought 10 percent of Internet systems to a halt in November 1988, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) charged the SEI
with setting up a center to coordinate communication among experts
during security emergencies and to help prevent future incidents. Since
then, the CERT®/CC has helped to establish other response teams and
our incident handling practices have been adopted by more than 85
response teams around the world. (CERT®/CC, Meet, 2000)
Upon completion of his analysis, Howard found the following with respect to Internet
security activity:
A total of 4,567 incidents over this 7 year period were
reconstructed from the CERT®/CC records. This included 268 false
alarms (5.9%), and 4,299 actual incidents (94.1%). Most of the
CERT®/CC incidents (89.3%) were unauthorized access incidents, which
were further classified into their degree of success in obtaining access:
root break-in (27.7%), account break-in (24.1%), and access attempts
(37.6%). Relative to the growth in Internet hosts, each of these access
categories was found to be decreasing over the period of this research:
root-level break-ins at a rate around 19% less than the increase in
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Internet hosts, account-level break-ins at a rate around 11% less, and
access attempts at a rate around 17% less.
Of the 4,299 actual incidents reported to the CERT®/CC, 458
(10.7%) were classified as unauthorized use incidents. These were
further classified into denial-of-service attacks (2.4%), corruption of
information incidents (3.1%), and disclosure of information incidents
(5.1%). The growth in total unauthorized use incidents was around 9%
per year greater than the growth in Internet hosts. (Howard, Analysis,
1997:235)
These studies provide a snapshot of the Internet security activity, from the DOD,
Air Force, and public's perspective, from 1989 through 1995. Still, as illustrated by the
following examples, analyzing and subsequently classifying this activity continues to be
a problem. When questioned about yearly reports of hacker attacks against the DOD,
several key DOD and government subject matter experts provided the following
responses:
•

Air Force Maj. General John Campbell, commander of the Joint Task
force for Computer Network Defense said the number of attacks was
approximately 250,000, with unauthorized intrusions equaling 22,144 in
1999. (Verton, 2000:10)

•

Lt. General David Kelley, director of the Defense Information Systems
Agency said unauthorized intrusions increased about 300 percent, 5,844
in 1998 to 18,433 in 1999. (Ibid.:10)

•

Lt. Col. LeRoy Lungren, program manager for the Army's National
Security Improvement Program, said the Army had 285,000 network
queries in 2000. (Ibid.:10)

•

The Department of Justice said the number of government hacking cases
increased from 547 in 1998 to 1,154 in 2000. (Ibid.: 10)

Not only were the figures stating the magnitude of the problem different, but also with
respect to this study, these subject matter experts used different words to describe the
problem. This is not solely their fault.
By looking at the Air Force's Internet security information collection process, one
can see that the process itself adds to the ambiguity. Appendix E and Appendix F
contains examples of the forms the Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team
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(AFCERT) uses to gather Internet security incident from the Air Force community.
AFCERT provides "information protect (IP) assistance to Air Force units" (AFCERT,
2000). These forms allow Air Force personnel to report Internet security activity
information to the AFCERT. AFCERT's peers, the Army CERT (ACERT), the CERT
Coordination Center (CERT®/CC), the DOD CERT, the Federal Computer Incident
Response Center (FeDCIRC), and the Navy Computer Incident Response Team
(NAVCIRT) use similar forms to collect Internet security activity information. Appendix G
through Appendix L contains examples of their forms.
Table 3 provides further examples detailing the problem of classify Internet
security attacks and incidents. Table 3 lists keywords from various sources
encompassing communication, computer, network, and Internet security used to
describe Internet security attacks and incidents.
Table 3 - Internet Security Attacks and Incidents Keyword List

•
•
•

•
•

•

Access attempts
Account break-in
Corruption of
information
incidents
Denial-of-service
Disclosure of
information
incidents
Root break-in

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

(Howard, Analysis,
1997:93)

Attacks on bugs in Web servers
(e.g., CGI script-related attacks)
Attacks related to insecure
passwords
Attacks related to protocol
weaknesses
Buffer overflows
Denial-of-Service
Exploits related to active program
scripting/mobile code (ActiveX,
Java, JavaScript, VBS
Viruses/Trojans/Worms

•
•
•
•
•
•

Compromise
Computer Crime
Computer
Security Incident
Impersonation (a
form of spoofing)
Malicious
LogicA/irus/Worm
Vulnerability

(Department of the Air
Force, AFDIR 33-303,
1999)

(Briney, 2000:40)

AFSSI 5021

AFDIR 33-303

2000 Information Survey

Howard's 1997 Study

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Administrative
Vulnerability
Breach
Incident
Intruder
Malicious Logic
Penetration
Technical
Vulnerability

(Department of the Air
Force, AFSSI 5021,
1996:8)

The keyword list contains similar terms used to describe Internet security incidents,
however a one-to-one correlation does not exist. In fact, the 2000 Information Survey
even uses two types of subcategories, insider and outsider. Thus, the confusing
answers given by the DOD and government subject matter experts appear to be
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understandable. Consequently, the need to develop a coherent, consistent method to
classify Internet security attacks and incidents exists.

The Research Questions
This thesis examines the computer and network attack taxonomies developed by
Howard. Howard developed the taxonomies to help him classify Internet security
incidents as part of his doctoral research and to develop a common language for
computer security as part of a follow-on study. A resulting recommendation included
continued evaluation of the computer and network attack taxonomy to make practical
modifications. According to Howard, "the taxonomy developed for this research was
found to be satisfactory" (Howard, Analysis, 1997:235). When interviewed about the
review process of the taxonomy, Howard replied, "my dissertation taxonomy was only
reviewed by the committee, although Tom Longstaff was both on my committee and one
of the CERT managers" (Howard, Interview, 2000). Therefore, one research question
for this study is, "Are Howard's 1997 and 1998 computer and network attack taxonomies
still satisfactory?".
A second research question is, "How do the taxonomies compare to the
information being collected about computer and network attacks?". Several civilian,
government and military organizations collect information concerning computer and
network attacks. If the taxonomies are satisfactory, making sure these organizations
collect the appropriate information to use with them would help the taxonomies become
accepted, and eventually used.
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Methodology

I may not have gone where I intended to go, but I think I have ended up
where I intended to be. Douglas Adams (qtd. in Quoteland.com, 2000)

Research Design
The study uses a qualitative research method to conduct this study, using two
techniques: a questionnaire and content analysis. According to Dooley, qualitative
research refers to "social research based on field observations analyzed without
statistics" (Dooley, 1995:259). He succinctly described the analysis this researcher
plans to perform:
The analysis of qualitative data begins with the first observation. As
the observation phase winds down, analysis becomes more intense.
Analysis organizes the hundreds of pages of raw notes into a meaningful
pattern. It interconnects discrete observations and locates these
connected events within a small number of conceptual categories. As
with a jigsaw puzzle, the researcher fits and refits the pieces according to
a variety of tentative models until few unconnected pieces remain and the
fit seems subjectively and logically satisfying.
A final report gives the resulting "jigsaw" picture as clearly and
convincingly as possible. A common reporting method combines
quotations from interview with anecdotes from the field observations to
illustrate and support the analyst's general arguments. In support of a
casual model, the analyst may report the approximate frequency and
distribution of the different categories of observations (for example, high
versus low proselytizing) as evidence. Such event counts may even
support basic statistical analysis, but the qualitative researcher seldom
relies as heavily on statistics as does the quantitative researcher.
(Dooley, 1995:271)
Based on the results of this process, this researcher will make inferences relative to the
research question.

Methodology
Since this study includes both of Howard's taxonomies, the following
methodology applies to both. Round 1 involves the 1997 computer and network attack
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taxonomy and Round 2 involves the 1998 computer and network attack taxonomy. First,
the researcher plans to analyze the computer and network attack taxonomy by using a
questionnaire with Likert-style scaling. Likert-style scaling "consists of a statement
followed by a number of possible levels of agreement (for example, from 'strongly agree'
to 'strongly disagree')" (Dooley, 1995:103). This researcher selected a 4-point scale to
compel the respondents to make a discrete decision about the taxonomy, thereby
reducing the possibility of the researcher misinterpreting the respondents' level of
agreement with the questions. The questions came from Howard's definition and
characterization of a satisfactory taxonomy. Thus, the respondents will base their
professional judgments using the same criteria as Howard.
This researcher plans to use a nonprobability sampling method to select
respondents to complete the questionnaire. Nonprobability sampling is "any method in
which the elements have unequal chances of being selected" (Dooley, 1995:135). As a
result, this researcher will use a purposive sampling procedure to select the elements,
which are the respondents. In purposive sampling, the researcher "chooses
respondents because of certain characteristics" (Ibid.:136). This researcher will select
respondents based upon characteristics related to their background and knowledge, not
their job category or job description. This differentiation is necessary because
information security functions and responsibilities span several disciplines, as illustrated
in the Information Magazine 2000 Information Security Survey in Table 4. In addition,
these security professionals allocate various portions of their job responsibilities to their
job of information security as illustrated in Table 4.

37

Table 4 - Job Category
Percentage
Job Category
Unit/Department/Division Manager
20%
Consultant
15%
14%
CISO
Engineer/Developer
14%
Administrator/Operator
12%
Analyst
11%
9%
Executive/Partner/Principal
Auditor
5%
100%
(Briney, 2000:42)
Table 5 - Portion of Job Responsibilities Devoted to Infosecurity
Portion of job responsibilites
devoted to infosecurity

Percentage
Part
59%
All
40%
None
1%
100%
(Briney, 2000:42)

The significance of this information is that "a Forrester Research survey conducted this
past May found that only about half of managers participate in risk management
activities. To a certain extent, that suggests that security is riding the coattails of
business initiatives that involve security, but aren't necessarily security-driven" (Briney,
2000:44).
Therefore, knowledge, not job category or job position is more important for this
analysis, thus the purposive sampling technique. With that in mind, the characteristics
used to select the respondents for this study were Air Force military member, Air Force
civilian professional, or civilian professional with a background in the following
disciplines: computer security, information security, communication security, information
assurance, Internet security, and information warfare.
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Although the respondents represent a larger population, this researcher will not
use their responses or generate statistics intended to generalize to the larger population.
Their responses, based upon their professional opinions, will only be used to analyze if
the taxonomies are still satisfactory within the constraints of this study. In addition, the
questionnaire represents categorical data, not numerical data. Consequently, they
represent "arbitrarily selected numerical codes for the categories and have no utility
beyond that" (McClave, Benson, and Sincich, 1998:14). However, the data can be
ranked and meaningfully ordered, which this researcher plans to do. This data will be
used to infer the level of agreement the respondents have with Howard's description of
satisfactory.
Next, this researcher will perform a content analysis of the comments submitted
by the respondents and the business forms used by Internet security activity
organizations. Content analysis "is a research technique for making replicable and valid
inferences from data to their content" (Krippendorff, 1980:21). This researcher will use
the analytical semantics textual analysis approach. According to Rosengren, "it is
possible to make reasonable interpretations of a text. The reasonableness is dependent
on certain contextual claims, which can be linguistical, logical, semantical, or empirical"
(Rosengren, 1981:29).
With respect to the questionnaire, this researcher will use the comments
submitted by the respondents for any Disagree or Strongly Disagree selection, as well
as the comments submitted for question 7. Question 7 explicitly solicits inputs for areas
of improvement for the taxonomy. Both sets of comments use an open-ended question
format. Open-ended questions are, "questions in interviews and on questionnaires that
have no pre-specified answers" (Hoffer, George, and Valacich, 1998:244). In addition,
each respondent is encouraged to "talk about whatever interests him or her in within the
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general bounds of the question" (lbid.:244). Upon completion of the content analysis of
the respondents' comments, the researcher will analyze the business forms used by
Internet security organizations to collect information on Internet security activity.
According to Hoffer, George, and Valacich, "[.••] a document useful to systems
analysts is a business form [...]" (1998:255) because "forms are important for
understanding a system because they explicitly indicate what data flow in or out of a
system [...]" (Ibid.:257). Consequently, this researcher will analyze the business forms
used by various Internet security activity organizations, to determine if these
organizations collect appropriate information which will help Internet security
professional adequately use the computer and network taxonomy to classify Internet
attacks and incidents. These organizations are:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT)
Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT)
Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT®/CC)
DOD Computer Emergency Response Team (DOD CERT)
Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FeDCIRC)
Navy Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT), this includes the
Marine Corps

Similar to the rationale for selecting the questionnaire respondents, the researcher
selected these organizations because they represent a collective community of similar
interest. This researcher also included the CERT®/CC because it was Howard's data
source for his study and because it is the de facto Internet security community leader, as
stated in the 1988 DARPA press release:
In providing direct service to the Internet community, the CERT will
focus on the special needs of the research community and serve as a
prototype for similar operations in other computer communities [...].
It will also serve as a focal point for the research community for
identification and repair of security vulnerabilities, informal assessment of
existing systems in the research community, improvement to emergency
response capability, and user security awareness. (CERT®/CC, DARPA,
2001)
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This researcher will develop a process-to-data entity matrix, illustrated in Table 6 and
Table 7 as output from this analysis. A process-to-data entity matrix "identifies which
data are captured, used, updated, or deleted within a process" (Hoffer, George, and
Valacich, 1998:174). This process-to-data entity matrix will provide a more detailed view
of the correlation between the information collected by these Internet security
organizations and the computer and network attack taxonomies.
Table 6 - Business Form vs. 1997 Taxonomy Categories Matrix Example
ATTACKERS

ACCESS

TOOLS

RESULTS

OBJECTIVES

ACERT
AFCERT
CERT®/CC
DOD CERT
FeDCIRC
NAVCIRT

Table 7 - Business Form vs. 1998 Taxonomy Categories Matrix Example
ATTACKERS

TOOLS

VULNERABILITY

ACERT
AFCERT
CERT®/CC
DOD CERT
FeDCIRC
NAVCIRT
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ACTION

TARGET

UNAUTHORIZED
RESULT

OBJECTIVES

IV. Results and Analysis

There is one thing even more vital to science than intelligent methods;
and that is, the sincere desire to find out the truth, whatever it may be."
Charles Sanders Pierce (qtd. in Quoteland.com, 2000)

Round 1 -1997 Computer and Network Attack Questionnaire
This researcher developed a questionnaire, contained in Appendix A, to analyze
the level of agreement that the respondents had that the computer and network attack
taxonomy was satisfactory. The questionnaire provided a mechanism to gather
information concerning the taxonomy in a consistent manner, from all respondents. This
researcher calculated composite scores for each question by summing up the scores of
each item, in this case the level of agreement selected, for each question (Dooley, 1995,
103). Each question carried the same weight, meaning each question was considered
just as important as the other, for the purposes of this study. In addition, Howard stated
that his committee, which consisted of four members, reviewed his taxonomy and found
it to be satisfactory. This researcher released 18 questionnaires and received 10 back,
resulting in a 56% response rate. The number of returned questionnaires, each
representing a single respondent, surpassed the total number of reviewers for Howard's
original study; this was a goal of this process.
Overall, the majority of the respondents agreed that the 1997 computer and
network attack taxonomy was satisfactory. The modal level of agreement for questions
1 - 6, which is also the item receiving the highest composite score for each question,
was Agree. Underscoring this modal level of agreement by the respondents was the fact
that one hundred percent of the respondents selected Agree for question 6, the only
question to receive a unanimous opinion. Question 6 explicitly asks the respondents
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about their level of agreement with the statement that the taxonomy is useful. No
respondent selected either extreme level, Strongly Agree or Strongly Disagree. Table 8
lists the composite scores for questions 1 - 6 of the questionnaire.
Table 8 - Composite Scores of 1997 Taxonomy Questionnaire
Question
1. The computer and network attack
taxonomy meets the described
characteristics of MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE.
2. The computer and network attack
taxonomy meets the described
characteristics of EXHAUSTIVE.
3. The computer and network attack
taxonomy meets the described
characteristics of UNAMBIGUOUS.
4. The computer and network attack
taxonomy meets the described
characteristics of REPEATABLE.
5. The computer and network attack
taxonomy meets the described
characteristics of ACCEPTED.
6. The computer and network attack
taxonomy meets the described
characteristics of USEFUL.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

0

6

4

0

0

6

4

0

0

6

4

0

0

6

3

0

0

8

1

0

0

10

0

0

Although the modal level of agreement for questions 1 - 6 was Agree, those
respondents that selected Disagree provided valuable information concerning the
taxonomy. The following paragraphs summarize their comments. Appendix B, Table 12
contains all the respondents' comments, verbatim.
Question 1 inquired about mutual exhaustiveness. The respondents felt that
although Howard defined discrete categories, the respondents provided several
examples of the existence of overlap between categories. The statement about a
hacker can wear two hats, one as a terrorist working for an enemy nation and one as a
vandal causing frivolous damage, was a clear example. They also pointed out that
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overlap can, and mostly likely does, exist between every category. One interesting
observation is that the respondents focused primarily on the Attacker category.
Question 2 inquired about exhaustiveness. Since several respondents were Air
Force members, this question resulted in a few military specific comments. Internet
incidents for military purposes did not appear to be included in the taxonomy, according
to some respondents, although one can speculate that a terrorist working for a
nation/state under military control would qualify as a military operation classification.
Additionally, Howard's list of tools does not include energy pulses or the tried and true
social engineering. As such, the respondents do offer clear examples that the taxonomy
may not be as exhaustive as it seemed initially.
Question 3 inquired about unambiguousness. These comments appear to be
closely related to the mutual exclusivity comments. If issues exist with mutual
exclusivity, then it is not surprising that issues also exist with unambiguousness. As
stated, the objective of an incident may be to obtain some type of monetary payoff,
however that payoff action may have resulted from the theft of valuable information.
Therefore, how would one classify this event? As illustrated earlier in the use of various
terms to describe Internet security incidents, clearly and concisely defining these actions
continues to be a problem.
Question 4 inquired about repeatability. The comments provided appear to
question the repeatability characteristic of the taxonomy. First, if issues exist with
mutual exclusivity and unambiguousness, then how can one repeat the classification
process the same way, if one is confused about which category to use? Second, based
on the issues stated, how can the taxonomy appear logical if issues exist? The answer
may be in logic itself. If one uses logic, or more appropriately, common sense
reasoning, then it is likely that the process of classifying incidents could be repeated.
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However, this appears to defy the purpose of a taxonomy. By definition, a taxonomy is a
"division into ordered groups or categories" ("Taxonomy"). Therefore, one would simply
classify, or place, an incident in the appropriate group or category, with little to no
reasoning required. It is worth noting that in Howard's discussion on developing the
computer and network attack taxonomy, repeatability appeared to be a problem with
several of the taxonomies discussed.
Question 5 inquired about acceptability. Although one respondent disagreed with
this question, the disagreement appears to be with the term Accepted. Howard defined
accepted as, "logical and intuitive so that they could become generally approved"
(Howard, Analysis, 1997:53). Since the modal level of agreement for this question was
Agree, it appears the majority of respondents understood the taxonomy and believed it
was logical and intuitive.
Question 6 inquired about usefulness. As stated earlier, this was the only
question that all the respondents came to the same conclusion, by selecting Agree.
Even with the questions about the other classification categories, all the respondents, to
include those who disagreed about other areas, selected Agree. Unfortunately, no
additional comments were provided, so this researcher would have to speculate about
this result. Notwithstanding the lack of comments, the cliche, a picture is worth a
thousand words, could justly apply. As noted in this study, and others, identification,
classification, and even annotation of Internet security incidents are a problem. As
Howard noted:
The Internet is a scary place. At least that's what we've been told by
numerous authors - scholars and sensationalists alike [...]. Prior to this
research, our knowledge of security problems on the Internet was
incomplete and primarily anecdotal. Despite our increasing reliance on
the computer networks, there had been no systematic and coordinated
program for gathering and distributing information about Internet security
incidents. (Howard, Analysis, 1997: 1)
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As such, the fact that the computer and network attack taxonomy may be one of the first
graphical descriptions of the intruder process viewed by the respondents, the taxonomy
itself could be the reason behind the unanimous selection of Agree for question 6.
Finally, question 7 was an unadulterated solicitation for suggestions for areas of
improvement to the taxonomy. This solicitation in no means suggests that Howard's
work is flawed. In contrast, it is recognition of the process that Howard developed.
According to Hammer and Champy, a process is "a collection of activities that takes one
or more kinds of inputs and creates an output that is of value to a customer" (Hammer
and Champy, 1993:35). In this case, Howard created a process to assist the Internet
security professionals by taking their inputs, a security anomaly, and turning it into
something useful, a classified attack or incident. In fact, the taxonomy is a process itself,
starting with the attacker's perspective and ending with the attacker's objectives
(Howard, Analysis, 1997:71). Therefore, change should be considered a normal part of
the life of any process, not an indication of a flaw.
The respondents provided numerous recommendations on areas of improvement
to the taxonomy, which are listed in Appendix B, Table 13. Several trends and ideas
resulted from the information provided by the respondents. It is interesting to note that
many of the suggestions appear as items lacking in the taxonomy, in actuality they
reflect two issues underlying this study: lack of a common language and lack of a
structured method to classify Internet security incidents. As noted by Howard and
Longstaff, "much of the computer security information regularly gathered and
disseminated by individuals and organizations cannot currently be combined or
compared because a 'common language' has yet to emerge in the field of computer
security" (Howard and Longstaff, 1998:iii). As such, what may appear as something
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missing may in fact exist, however it is referenced differently. In addition, since a
structured process does not appear to exist, it is possible that the respondents'
interpretation of the taxonomy process differs.
Howard also noted that, "it should be expected, however, for a satisfactory
taxonomy to be limited in some of these characteristics. A taxonomy is an
approximation of reality that is used to gain greater understanding in a field of study.
Because it is an approximation, it will fall short in some characteristics" (Howard,
Analysis, 1997:53). Notwithstanding these issues, several threads appeared after
analyzing the suggestions from the respondents.
In general, as indicated by several comments from the respondents, questions
exist about the completeness of the classification categories, mutually exclusive,
exhaustive, unambiguousness, repeatable, accepted, and useful. Howard published the
taxonomy in 1997, however as stated in this study, the Internet and peripheral industries
have experienced tremendous growth and change since then. As such, it makes sense
that the taxonomy may not reflect the current language used today, with respect to
Internet security activity.
Concerning the Attacker category, the taxonomy does list several types of
Attackers, but some respondents felt it needs to differentiate between insider and
outsider. An insider refers to "full- or part-time employees, contracted workers,
consultants, company partners or suppliers" (Briney, 2000:48) and outsider refers to
"everyone not included in the description for 'insider'" (lbid.:49). This differentiation
could apply to all the Attacker types included in the taxonomy. In addition, several
comments had a military slant to them, such as information warfare and the observe,
orient, decide, and act (OODA) Loop. As noted, several respondents were Air Force
officers, who obviously have a military view to many things.
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Several key issues resulted from the comments on the Tools category. First, the
Tools category implies, or leads one to interpret, that each tool listed refers to a single
process. To clarify, a respondent annotated that Attackers most likely use one or more
tools to accomplish their goal, and the taxonomy requires the user to chose a specific
tool. This leads into the second key issue, interpretation of the taxonomy. Again, one
respondent noted that one may interpret that all the blocks on the taxonomy line up
horizontally, therefore, hackers goes to user commands which goes to implementation
vulnerability, etc. As stated earlier, interpretation of the taxonomy itself many lead one
to assume it is lacking in certain areas. Finally, some respondents felt the Tools
category focused solely on the technical aspects of Internet security activity. Based on
one's interpretation of Tools, this category does not include Social Engineering, stealing
of passwords, and simple human error as tools towards obtaining the objective.
The Access category appears to contain three distinct groupings of information.
It was the only category that a respondent clearly stated that the meaning of this
category was unclear. However, similar to the Tools comments, issues such as Social
Engineering, stealing of passwords, and simple human error appear to be missing.
Although, one can argue that problems with implementation, design, configuration, and
access control can result from human error.
The Results category comments followed the same trend as the other categories.
Even though Howard wanted to avoid simply listing items, lists to occur within each
category. As such, lists tend to leave one opened to the question, "Why didn't you
include this one?" The respondents offered several other types of Results, to include
financial loss, customer goodwill loss, posturing for future actions, and permanent
destruction of information. An interesting comment concerned the issue that the
taxonomy appears to focus on short-term, not long-term results. The respondent
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suggested that an Attacker's objective might take a long time to achieve. This end to the
means may result in several of the categories listed by Howard, in both the short-term
and the long-term, as the Attacker works towards the end objective; this is a very
interesting concept. Consequently, the respondent appears to believe that the taxonomy
misses this concept, and implies that a Result is the end of the Attacker's work, which
immediately leads to an Objective.
Finally, the Objectives category comments also resemble those previously
stated. The listing itself causes one to question why something was not included. The
respondents suggested items such as distinguishing between personal and corporate
gains and including the military perspective. However, one can argue that the
entertainment and education objectives are not missing, but are included within the
challenge and status list.
Even with all the suggested areas of improvement, the most important
information obtained from the questionnaire was that the respondents agreed that the
taxonomy was satisfactory. The fact that the modal level of agreement for questions 1 6 was Agree and that all the respondents selected Agree for the question that explicitly
asked them do they agree with the statement that the taxonomy meets the
characteristics described as useful, supports this claim.

Round 1 - Internet Security Information Collected verses the 1997 Taxonomy
This researcher found that although many organizations collect information on
Internet security activity, they do not freely release this information. Due to national
security concerns by the DOD and liability concerns of the private sector, these
organizations maintain strict security and confidentiality policies to protect the
information. Consequently, how can one operationally test the computer and network
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taxonomy? The method used by this researcher involved content analysis of the
business forms used by these organizations to collection Internet security activity
information. By analyzing these business forms, one can determine if the information
being collected is appropriate to use as inputs into the computer and network attack
taxonomy. In other words, are these organizations collecting the appropriate
information, which will help Internet security professionals adequately use the computer
and network taxonomy to classify Internet attacks and incidents?
This researcher collected and analyzed the business forms used by the following
Internet security organizations:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT)
Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team (AFCERT)
Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT®/CC)
DOD Computer Emergency Response Team (DOD CERT)
Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FeDCIRC)
Navy Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT), this includes the
Marine Corps
These business forms, located in Appendix E through Appendix L, detail the information
collected by these organizations to record Internet security activity. Table 9 illustrates
the relationship between the Internet security organizations' business forms and the
1997 taxonomy. A "Y indicates that the organization explicitly requests information
relative to that specific category. An "N" indicates that the organization does not
explicitly request information relative to that specific category.
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Table 9 - Business Form vs. 1997 Taxonomy Matrix
ATTACKERS

TOOLS

ACCESS

RESULTS

OBJECTIVES

ACERT

N

Y

Y

Y

N

AFCERT

N

Y

Y

Y

N

CERTO/CC

N

Y

Y

Y

N

DOD CERT

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

FeDCIRC

N

Y

Y

Y

N

NAVCIRT

N

Y

Y

Y

N

As illustrated above, all the organizations explicitly request information relative to
the Attackers, Tools, Access, and Results categories. The organizations have data
entry fields either specifically labeled using the same words as the taxonomy category or
very similar words. For example, the NAVCIRT form contains the data entry item, "9.
Damage or effects resulting from attack" (Department of the Navy, 1998). The only
organization that appears to explicitly request information about the Objectives was the
DOD CERT, otherwise none of the business forms contained any explicit reference to
Attackers or Objectives. In fact, this researcher only assumes that it is possible that
some victims include this type of information via the catchall data entry field, usually
labeled Describe the Incident.
Additional information gleaned from analyzing the business forms included the
finding that no standard form existed. Although the organizations use similar data entry
fields, a single form did not exist. A standard form would help the reporting process and
the information sharing process. Next, all the organizations provide the catch all data
entry field, Describe the Incident. The necessity of this data entry is obvious, however
the information entered is usually written from the victim's perspective, which most likely
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is different for each victim. The most interesting thing concerning this data entry field, is
the fact that the CERT®/CC appears to depend solely on this data entry field as its
source of information. The CERT®/CC's business form was the weakest, or less
specific, of all. This is surprising because it is assumed the CERT®/CC, which is the de
facto leader of the CERTs, collects the most detailed information of all. Finally, the
ACERT and AFCERT use two forms to collect their information; one form to report
intrusions or incidents, and one form to report malicious code. Although both are distinct
events, the need for two forms is unclear, especially since the NAVCIRT explicitly
collects both types of information on one form.
Although the Internet security activity monitoring organizations explicitly collect
information that can be used as input into the computer and network attack taxonomy,
they do not explicitly collect all the necessary information. As a result, there maybe a
disconnect between the information collected and the information needed by the
taxonomy.

Round 2 -1998 Computer and Network Attack Questionnaire
This researcher developed a questionnaire, contained in Appendix C, to analyze
the level of agreement that the respondents had with the 1998 computer and network
attack taxonomy was satisfactory. The researcher followed the same methodology used
for the 1997 taxonomy questionnaire. This researcher released 10 questionnaires to the
respondents that replied to the 1997 questionnaire, and received 7 back, resulting in a
70% response rate.
Overall, the majority of the respondents agreed that the 1998 computer and
network attack taxonomy was satisfactory. The modal level of agreement for questions
1, 3, 4, 5, and was Agree, and the modal level of agreement for question 2 was Strongly
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Agree and Agree. In fact, each question received at least one Strongly Agree selection.
No respondent selected the other extreme level of agreement, Strongly Disagree. Table
10 lists the composite scores for questions 1 - 6 of the questionnaire.
Table 10 - Composite Scores of 1998 Taxonomy Questionnaire
Question

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

1

4

2

0

3

3

1

0

2

4

1

0

2

4

1

0

2

5

0

0

3

4

0

0

1. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.
2. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
EXHAUSTIVE.
3. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
UNAMBIGUOUS.
4. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
REPEATABLE.
5. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
ACCEPTED.
6. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
USEFUL.

Although the modal level of agreement for questions 1 - 6 was Agree, or
Strongly Agree and Agree for question 2, those respondents that selected Disagree
provided valuable information concerning the 1998 computer and network attack
taxonomy. The following paragraphs summarize their comments. Appendix D, Table 14
contains all the respondents' comments, verbatim.
Question 1 inquired about mutual exclusiveness. A respondent believed that
there needed to be a distinction between internal and external user attack, because the
respondent believes internal users cause more damage. However, upon closer
examination, the respondent may be referring to accidental damage caused by internal
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users; this was not clear. In addition, another respondent reiterated the common theme
that the category may not be mutually exclusive, or in other words, as complete as
possible. Again, lists of items almost inevitably leave something out.
The remaining questions, which inquired about exhaustiveness,
unambiguousness, repeatability, acceptability, and usefulness, resulted in two total
comments. The comments simply question the completeness of the categories and the
interpretation of the taxonomy. Once again, claiming that a category contains everything
appears to challenge one to find the missing piece. In addition, individual interpretation
of the taxonomy may lead to problems with ambiguousness and repeatability. The
respondents submitted no comments about acceptability and usefulness.
The respondents provided several recommendations on areas of improvement to
the 1998 computer and network attack taxonomy, which are listed in Appendix D Table
15. Two trends appeared after analyzing the comments. First, the respondents
appeared to approve of the 1998 version of the taxonomy over the 1997. Their
comments include words such as much better, good, and no changes. Second,
questions over the completeness and interpretation of the taxonomy were apparent. To
reiterate, Howard published this taxonomy in 1998, which was static, compared to the
Internet, computers, and networks, which are dynamic.
Concerning the Attacker category, the respondents believed Howard's construct
was not only better than his 1997 taxonomy, but it appeared to represent Attackers in a
more acceptable way. The respondents appeared very pleased with the description of
this category. However, they did offer more suggestions on the continued stratification
of the category, such as distinguishing between hackers and crackers. Finally, a
comment that applies to the taxonomy in general is that one's interpretation of the
taxonomy may affect what is determined as missing or not missing.
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The comments about Tools appeared to be more questions about Howard's
definition of Tools, than anything else. Working in such a dynamic profession, many
accepted definitions, words, and phrases change frequently. However, by the nature of
the comments, they may implicitly justify the necessity of the computer and network
attack taxonomy to ensure everyone speaks the same language. Also, a respondent
provided an excellent example about why the questions exist about completeness of the
taxonomy, specifically mutual exclusiveness and unambiguousness. Toolkits, a tool,
consists of tools. How should these be classified? Therefore, one respondent believed
an obvious overlap exists with Toolkits and the tool types listed in the taxonomy.
Vulnerability received an interesting comment about the focus of the taxonomy.
Although Howard designed that the taxonomy from the attacker's perspective, a
respondent felt it focused more on the technological side of the issue. The respondent
clearly emphasized that the human element plays a role. The best security technology
cannot account for all human mistakes. Therefore, the respondent may be implying that
this category, and probably others, needs to reflect more of the human element within
this process.
The next categories, Action, Target, Unauthorized Result, and Objectives
received few comments. The comments provided simply acknowledged the
respondents' belief that the categories appropriately captured the content, or reiterated
questions about the taxonomy's completeness. The respondents appeared to
understand the meaning of Action, Target, Unauthorized Result, and Objectives. Those
who did not stated that one's interpretation of the taxonomy might result in different
meanings.
The respondents appeared to have a high level of agreement with Howard's
1998 computer and network attack taxonomy. Not only did some respondents select

55

Agree, some also selected Strongly Agree as their selection for a question. In fact,
question 2, which inquired about exhaustiveness, resulted in Strongly Agree and Agree
receiving the same composite score. In addition, the comments included questions
about the taxonomy's completeness and suggested further levels of details, however the
comments also included accolades toward the 1998 taxonomy.

Round 2 - Internet Security Information Collected verses the 1998 Taxonomy
The organizations that collect Internet security activity information explicitly
collect some, but not all information necessary for inputs into the taxonomy. Table 11
illustrates the relationship between the Internet security organizations' business forms
and the 1998 computer and network attack taxonomy. A "Y indicates that the
organization explicitly requests information relative to that specific category. An "N"
indicates that the organization does not explicitly request information relative to that
specific category.
Table 11 - Business Form vs. 1998 Taxonomy Matrix
ATTACKERS

ACERT
AFCERT
CERT®/CC
DOD CERT
FeDCIRC
NAVCIRT

N
N
N
N
N
N

TOOLS

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

VULNERABILITY

ACTION

TARGET

UNAUTHORIZED
RESULT

OBJECTIVES

N
N
N
N
N
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
Y
N
N

This process-to-data entity matrix also indicates that as the level of detail gets
finer, it appears the Internet security organizations need to ask more direct questions to
obtain the necessary information to use the 1998 taxonomy. The business forms used
by the Internet security organizations appear to request less detailed information than
what the 1998 taxonomy requires. As stated earlier, the de facto CERT leader
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CERT®/CC appears to collect less detailed information than all the other CERTs.
Regardless, these organizations do collect some information useful to the taxonomy and
with some work and coordination with the taxonomy developers, they can most likely
explicitly collect more.
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V. Discussion and Conclusion
When you make the finding yourself - even if you're the last person on Earth
to see the light - you'll never forget it. Carl Sagan (qtd. in Quoteland.com,
2000)

Discussion
Based on the results of the 1997 and 1998 computer and network attack
taxonomy questionnaires, this researcher concludes that Howard's taxonomies are
satisfactory. Overall, the majority of the respondents agreed that the 1997 taxonomy
was satisfactory because the modal level of agreement for questions 1 - 6 was Agree.
Underscoring this fact was that one hundred percent of the respondents selected Agree
for question 6, which explicitly asks the respondents about the statement that the
taxonomy is useful. In addition, the majority of respondents agreed that the 1998
taxonomy because the modal level of agreement for questions 1, 3,4, 5, and was
Agree, and the modal level of agreement for question 2 was Strongly Agree and
Agree. In fact, questions 1 - 6 all received at least one Strongly Agree selection.
It appears that the respondents preferred the 1998 taxonomy over the 1997
taxonomy. First, the 1998 taxonomy received 13 Strongly Agree selections, while the
1997 taxonomy did not receive any. Second, the 1998 taxonomy received fewer areas
of improvement comments than the 1997 taxonomy. Third, the 1998 taxonomy received
several accolades on its contents, while the 1997 received none. It is important to note
that the same group of respondents analyzed both taxonomies.
Although the respondents agreed that the taxonomies as a whole were
satisfactory, they did find areas of improvement with them. They offered evidence that
questioned the completeness of the taxonomy. In addition, they also indicated that even
though the taxonomy may have met the definitions of mutually exclusive, exhaustive,

58

unambiguous, repeatable, accepted, and useful, these categories may still need work to
persuade others to fully agree with the statements. However, the transition from the
1997 taxonomy to the 1998 taxonomy appeared to have addressed many of the
respondents' concerns. The additional stratification of the taxonomy appears to have
provided the level of detail that the respondents agreed with.
With respect to the relationship of the Internet security organizations' information
gathering process and the taxonomy, there appears to be a disconnect. These
organizations do explicitly collect some, but not all, the information necessary as inputs
into the taxonomies. The analysis of both taxonomies resulted in similar findings, except
that the 1998 taxonomy required more detailed information. Since the computer and
network attack taxonomy is relatively new, it is quite likely that these organizations either
are not aware of the taxonomy, or if aware, have not accepted its use. Regardless,
some of the necessary information is explicitly collected.
Along that line, explicit requests for information on Attackers and Objectives
appeared lacking. First, several of the organizations requested the Internet Protocol (IP)
address as a method to identify the source of the attack. The IP address is actually part
of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), which is the suite of
protocols used to send and receive information across the Internet. By definition,
TCP/IP is:
The most accurate name for the set of protocols known as the "Internet
Protocol Suite." TCP and IP are two of the protocols in this suite. Because
TCP and IP are the best known of the protocols, it has become common to
use the term TCP/IP or IP/TCP to refer to the whole family. TCP (the
"transmission control protocol") is responsible for breaking up the message
into datagrams, reassembling them at the other end, resending anything that
gets lost, and putting things back in the right order. IP (the "Internet Protocol")
is responsible for routing individual datagrams. (Department of the Air Force,
33-129, 1999:44)
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On the surface, using the IP address to identify attackers seem reliable, however based
on IP Spoofing, it is not. IP spoofing is:
The use of software to change the address of a data packet to make it appear
to come from another machine. Many network routers use these IP
addresses to identify which machines have valid access rights to the network.
Spoofing allows a hacker to "change his identity" and appear as a valid
machine within the network. (Ibid.:43)
Therefore, requesting the IP address alone does not provide enough information to
adequately, and confidently identify the Attackers.
Second, the lack of explicit requests for information relative to the attackers
Objective appears to be more nebulous. As indicated in Table 9 and Table 11, the DOD
CERT appears to be the only Internet security organization that explicitly requests
information on the attackers' objective, via their Why field of their business form. It is
unknown exactly what information goes into this field, however at least the DOD CERT
asks the questions.
The analysis of the information collection process did reveal some interesting
information. First, the information collection process appeared disjointed between the
organizations. For example, they do not use standard forms to collect the Internet
security activity information. As such, each organization asks different questions, from
different perspectives, using different data entry methods, although they appear to be
looking for the same thing; information on Internet security attacks and incidents.
According to Hoffer, George, and Valacich:
The goal of a form and report design is usability. Usability means that users
can use a form or report quickly, accurately, and with high satisfaction. To be
usable, designs must be consistent, efficient, self-explanatory, well-formatted,
and flexible. (1998:540)
Obviously, the CERTs have business forms that allow them to collect information,
however the inconsistencies noted indicate that a standard information collection
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process does not exist. The lack of a standard data collection process appears to
perpetuate the lack of a common language problem, by continuing to allow victims to
report incidents in a somewhat haphazard fashion.

Limitations and Constraints
Although the respondents deemed the taxonomy satisfactory, it does have some
limitations. First, it includes lists of items per category, which seems appropriate.
However, as stated throughout this thesis, lists beg some to discover the missing piece,
or at least what they perceive as the missing piece. Second, it appears to encapsulate
the attacker's process well, however others do, as indicated by the respondents'
comments, interpret the process differently. This may be a human characteristic, but it is
important to note that not everyone interprets the process the same way. Finally, this
study included observations and professional interpretations of the taxonomy. To further
validate the model it needs to be operationally tested. Operational testing involves using
actual incident reports to determine how effective the taxonomies in the classification of
computer and network attacks and incidents. This testing will further validate the
taxonomies and encourage its acceptance and use.
Concerning the respondents of the questionnaire, some limitations existed too.
As indicated in Table 4, the information security profession traverses many disciplines.
Although on one hand it can mean the information security level of awareness is high,
since so many disciplines are concerned about it, but on the other hand, when
specifically looking for the information security points of contact, it can be difficult. This
researcher had to interview some of the respondents before allowing them to participate
in the analysis, because it was not clear if they had the appropriate background. In more
than one occasion, the original contacts responded by saying they were not the
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appropriate persons for the interview, and referred the researcher to another contact.
However, the sample size used for this study was small. A larger sample size should be
used with future studies, which should allow the researcher to generalize to the larger
population. Along that line, a comprehensive, validated survey instrument should be
used to better capture the intent of the respondents.
Comprehensive information on Internet security incidents is lacking. According
to Fred B. Schneider, Chair, Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness, and
editor of Trust in Cyberspace, "insufficient data exist about Internet outages and how the
Internet's mechanisms are able to deal with them" (Schneider, et al., 1999:47).
Schneider's committee participated in a DARPA and NSA requested study, in
conjunction with the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, the
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications, and the National
Research Council. The DARPA and NSA tasked the committee to "examine, discuss,
and report on interrelated issues associated with the research, development, and
commercialization of technologies for trustworthy systems and to use its assessment to
develop recommendations for research to enhance information systems trustworthiness"
(Schneider, et al., 1999:viii). Among other findings, the committee found that "a few
university computer science departments have several faculty members who emphasize
computer security research, but many departments have none who do. In any event, the
number of computer security researchers is small compared to the number in other
specialties [...]" (Ibid.:235). In short, the body of knowledge with respect to Internet
security incidents is probably incomplete.
Of the available information, the lack of access to actual incident data was stifling
to this researcher. For the purposes of this study, this researcher attempted to acquire
Internet security information from the CERT®/CC, AFCERT, as well as the local
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organizations. All denied access to their information due to security or confidentiality
concerns. These concerns are valid, however if the Internet community, specifically
researchers, cannot get access to this information, then how can the community learn to
improve itself and its security methods?
Similarly, the lack of a standard business form to collect Internet security attack
and incident information also limited this study. The use of different keywords and data
entry formats required this researcher to literally figure out what the organizations were
requesting. The forms were not consistent, self-explanatory, or well-formatted. Some
were text documents converted into web pages, some were elaborate forms, and some
were lists of several items to include in a report.

Implications for Researchers
The study revealed that the computer and network attack taxonomy appears to
be on the right track to help the Internet security community effectively classify computer
and network attacks and incidents. Future study of the taxonomy will help it mature and
possibly become an accepted part of computer and network security profession.
In addition, this study also revealed that Howard's work towards developing a
common language for computer security appears appropriate. As indicated, several of
the computer emergency response teams do not use standard forms or standard
language when requesting pertinent information. These organizations collect similar, but
not totally the same type of information. Researchers should continue this path of
examination to help the industry work towards a more coherent method of information
collection and dissemination.
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Implications for Practitioners
This study revealed that not only does Internet security appear to be a problem,
but so is the process of describing the level of Internet security activity. Throughout this
study interpretation appeared. American Heritage defines interpretation as, "the act of
interpreting; explanation of what is obscure; translation; version; construction; as, the
interpretation of a foreign language, of a dream, or of an enigma" ("Interpretation"). It is
disconcerting that with issues such as national security, intellectual property rights, and
electronic commerce at risk via the Internet that the industry continues to have difficulty
plainly describing the status of Internet security. Practitioners should work towards a
common model and common language to help the industry better address and identify
risks associated these issues.
Recommendations for Future Research
Perhaps the most important recommendation is continued monitoring and
examination of the computer and network taxonomy. This study revealed several areas
of improvement of the taxonomy. These areas of improvement should be analyzed to
determine their feasibility and to help validate the respondents' comments, as well as the
second iteration of the computer and network taxonomy.
In addition to continued examination of the taxonomy, this researcher
recommends operational testing of the taxonomy. Operational testing would allow one
to use actual incident information to test the taxonomy, which moves forward from
examining the concepts behind the taxonomy. Operational testing would further validate
the taxonomy, as well as increase its exposure to, and possible acceptance by, the
Internet security community.
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To facilitate the use of the computer and network attack taxonomy, this
researcher recommends development of a standard information collection process for
Internet security activity. The development of a standard process would help all
interested parties focus on the same kinds of information and probably lead to a
common language too. In addition, this process could be coordinated with the
maintainers of the computer and network taxonomy. This coordination would facilitate
the taxonomy's use and acceptance by the Internet security community and ensure the
information collection process collects the appropriate information necessary for the
taxonomy.
By using prototyping and Rapid Application Development, which is a "systems
development methodology created to radically decrease the time needed to design an
implement information systems" (Hoffer, George, Valacich, 1998:835), that also benefits
from "extensive user involvement" (lbid.:835), a standard form can be developed, as
shown in Appendix M, in a relatively quick fashion. The recommended standard form
uses the common elements found on the business forms used by the CERTs analyzed
for this study. Next, it includes all the distinct elements of Howard's 1998 taxonomy,
because this version appeared to be the preferred version based on this study. By
combining these two data sets, the CERTs can explicitly capture an abundance of
information about computer and network attacks, plus the collected information would be
appropriate as input into the computer and network attack taxonomy. In addition, the
design of the form allows computer programmers to quickly convert the format into a
functional database. Each line item on page 1 and each element on page 2 can map
one-to-one to a database field, thus allowing the CERTs to better automate, analyze,
and report on the status of Internet security activity. Finally, concerning flexibility for the
uniqueness of the CERTs, each organization can add data elements as they deem
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necessary. This allows the organizations to tailor the form to conform to any specific
requirements they have. However, it is important that the standard sections of the form,
in this case pages one and two, not be modified without total agreement from all the
CERTs and the taxonomy developers. These sections represent the information that
should be common across the board.
Finally, congruent to the development of a standard information collection
process, an information release process should be developed. Taking into account the
security and liability concerns, a process should be developed to help interested parties
with valid reasons gain access to the collected data. Without access to this data,
examining successes and areas of improvements will remain difficult.

Conclusion
This researcher concludes that Howard's 1997 and 1998 computer and network
attack taxonomies are satisfactory, based upon the results of the questionnaires. The
respondents did appear to agree with the 1998 taxonomy more than the 1997 taxonomy.
It appears that the 1998 taxonomy appears to have addressed many of the areas of
improvement comments submitted for the 1997 taxonomy.
In addition, this researcher concludes that there appears to be a disconnect
between the organizations responsible for collecting Internet security data and the
developers of the taxonomy. The organizations do collect some information that can be
used as inputs to the taxonomy, but not all. If the taxonomies are to become accepted
and used, then the data collectors and the taxonomy developers should coordinate their
efforts.
Similarly, it appears that the organizations collecting information have not
advanced past the early days of simply collecting an abundance of abstract information,
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then trying to manually make sense of it all. Although this study indicated that problems
still exist with distinguishing between different types of computer and network attacks
and incidents, sufficient information technological resources exist to help these
organizations collect and analyze this information better. Asking more direct questions
of the victims to get the specifics, incorporating better database designs to store and
retrieve the information, and using information technology as an enabler to help analyze
this information would help move not only the information collection, but also the
information dissemination process, move forward.
Along the same line of thought, this researcher concludes that a standard
method for collecting computer and network attack information does not exist. The
responsible organizations do not use a standard form to collect computer and network
attack information, which results in each organization collecting similar, but not totally the
same type of information. Without standardization, these organizations will continue to
collect information concerning computer and network attacks and incidents in a
haphazard fashion, which probably fuels the lack of a common language problem
discussed in this study.
Finally, although the organizations gather information, this researcher concludes
that without access to actual computer and network attack data, the ability to
operationally test the taxonomies will continue to be difficult. The data collectors appear
to be gathering valuable information about computer and network attacks. The
computer and network attack taxonomy developers appear to have a model that some
computer security professional agree with. Yet, obtaining the data to take the next
testing step, operational testing, continues to be difficult. Operational testing will add to
the validity of the model.
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Appendix A -1997 Computer and Network Taxonomy Questionnaire

This questionnaire supports the thesis, An Analysis of the Computer and Network
Attack Taxonomy, written by Captain Richard C. Daigle, graduate student in the
Information Resource Management degree program. Read the background information
on Figure 1 - Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy and then proceed to the
questionnaire. Your contributions will be used to analyze the satisfactory usefulness of
the computer and network attack taxonomy, as defined by Mr. John D. Howard.
Attackers

To ob

Hackees

US«
Command

Spies

Script or
Program

•
Tenons ts

Autonomous
Agent

Corporate
Raide a

Toolkit

Professional
Criminals

Distribute d
Tool

Vandals

Data Tap

Results

Objectives

Files

Corruption of
Information

Challenge, Status

Data in
Transit

Disclosure of
Information

Access

*

Implementation
Vulnerability

Unauthorized
Access

Design
Vulnerability

Unauthorised
Use

Configuration
Vulnerability

Processes

^

•

•

Theft of
Service

Political Gain

•
Financial G ain

Denial-ofservice

Damage

(Howard, Analysis, 1997: 73)
Figure 1 - Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy
Howard developed the computer and network attack taxonomy as part of his
dissertation, An Analysis of Security Incidents on the Internet 1989 - 1995, which he
submitted to Carnegie Mellon University, as part of his requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Engineering and Public Policy on 7 April 1997. The taxonomy was
not peer reviewed or analyzed by anyone outside of himself and his committee. As
such, the taxonomy does not represent an accepted model. However, it formed the
basis for Howard's research and it has been referenced in at least two publications:
a. 1998 Sandia National Laboratories report, A Common Language for
Computer Security Incidents by John D. Howard and Thomas A. Longstaff
b. 2000 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute Technical Report, State
of the Practice of Intrusion Detection Technologies by Julia Allen, et al.
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The following background information comes from a compilation of extracts from
Howard's research:
This taxonomy depicts a simplification of the path an attacker must take in order to
accomplish the attacker's objectives. To be successful, an attacker must find one
or more paths that can be connected, perhaps simultaneously.
Howard defined computer security as:
Computer security is preventing attackers from achieving objectives
through unauthorized access or unauthorized use of computers and
networks. (Howard, Analysis, 1997:50)
As the formal definition of computer security presented indicates computer security
is preventing attackers from achieving objectives by making any complete
connections through the steps depicted. More specifically, computer security
efforts are aimed at the five blocks of the taxonomy.
A popular and simple taxonomy of computer and network security attacks is a list
of single, defined terms. Variations of this approach include lists of categories.
There are several problems that limit the usefulness of these approaches including
1) the terms not being mutually exclusive, 2) an exhaustive list being difficult to
develop and unmanageably long, 3) the definitions of individual terms being difficult
to agree on, and 4) there being no structure to the categories.
An alternate categorization method is to structure the categories into a matrix. The
procedure for classification using these taxonomies, however, is not unambiguous
when actual attacks are classified. In addition, the logic is not intuitive, and the
classifications are limited in their usefulness.
The taxonomy developed as part of this research does not attempt to enumerate
all computer security flaws, or to enumerate all possible methods of attack, but
rather to reorient the focus of the taxonomy toward a process, rather than a single
classification category.
The final taxonomy presented was developed from the specific definition of
computer security.. .from the criticisms of the current taxonomies, and from a
process or operational viewpoint. From this viewpoint, an attacker on computers or
networks attempts to link to ultimate objectives or motivations. This link is
established through an operational sequence of tools, access, and results that
connects these attackers to their objectives...
The taxonomy "does not attempt to enumerate all computer security flaws, or to
enumerate all possible methods of attack, but rather attempts to provide a broad,
inclusive framework. The intention was to reorient the focus of the taxonomy
toward a process, rather than a single classification category, in order to provide
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both an adequate classification scheme for Internet attacks, and also a taxonomy
that would aid in thinking about computer and network security".
Extracted from An Analysis of Security Incidents on the Internet 1989 - 1995, by
John D. Howard, http://www.cert.org/research/JHThesis/Start.html.
The following information further helps you understand the five categories of the
computer and network attack taxonomy:
ATTACKERS
1. Attacker represents the people that attack computer and network services.
a. Hackers - break into computers primarily for the challenge and status
of obtaining access.
b. Spies - break into computers primarily for information which can be
used for political gain.
c. Terrorists - break into computers primarily to cause fear which will aid
in achieving political gain.
d. Corporate Raiders - employees of one company break into computers
of competitors for financial gain.
e. Professional Criminals - break into computers for personal financial
gain (not as a corporate raider).
f. Vandals - break into computers primarily to cause damage.
TOOLS
2. Tools used to exploit computer and network vulnerabilities.
a. User Command - the attacker enters commands at a command line or
graphical user interface.
b. Script or Program - scripts and programs initiated at the user interface
to exploit vulnerabilities.
c. Autonomous Agent - the attacker initiates a program, or program
fragment, which operates independently from the user to exploit
vulnerabilities.
d. Toolkit - the attacker uses a software package which contains scripts,
programs, or autonomous agents that exploit vulnerabilities.
e. Distributed Tool - the attacker distributes tools to multiple hosts, which
are then coordinated to perform an attack on the target host
simultaneously after some time delay.
f. Data Tap - where the electromagnetic radiation from a cable carrying
network traffic, or from a host computer is "listened" to by a device
external to the network or computer.
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ACCESS
3. Access used to breach computer and network services.
a. Vulnerability - a flaw that the attacker exploits to obtain unauthorized
access or use of the computer and network services.
b. Unauthorized access and use - Per Howard:
Because I felt that it was more important to emphasize the
unauthorized nature of an attacker's activities, I chose to use the
first pair of terms (unauthorized access and unauthorized use), but
it should be understood that unauthorized use implies authorized
access. In addition, it should be understood that unauthorized
access implies that this access will result in an unauthorized use.
(Howard, Analysis, 1997:50)
Both the means used to gain unauthorized access or use...as well
as the ends of attacks.. .are included [in the computer security
definition] because they require unauthorized access or
unauthorized use. (Howard, Analysis, 1997:51)
c. Processes, files and data in transit - protected resources which are
the targets of the attackers, both individually and collectively.
RESULTS
4. Results of attack once the attackers obtains access to the protected
resources and exploits the vulnerabilities.
a. Corruption of Information - any unauthorized alteration of files stored
on a host computer or data in transit across a network.
b. Disclosure of Information - the dissemination of information to anyone
who is not authorized to access that information.
c. Theft of Service - the unauthorized use of computer or network
services without degrading the service to other users.
d. Denial-of-service - the intentional degradation or blocking of computer
or network resources.
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OBJECTIVES
5. Objectives or primary motivations of the attackers gleaned from attacker
categories.
a. Challenge or Status - objective of hackers
b. Political Gain - objective of spies and terrorists
c. Financial Gain - objective of corporate raiders and professional
criminals
d. Damage - objective of vandals
According to Howard, a satisfactory taxonomy "should have classification
categories with the following characteristics" (53):
1. Mutually exclusive - classifying in one category excludes all others because
categories do not overlap
2. Exhaustive - taken together, the categories include all possibilities
3. Unambiguous - clear and precise so that classification is not uncertain,
regardless of who is classifying
4. Repeatable - repeated applications result in the same classification,
regardless of who is classifying
5. Accepted - logical and intuitive so that they could become generally approved
6. Useful - can be used to gain insight into the field of inquiry. (53)
Therefore, based upon the five category descriptions and the satisfactory taxonomy
definition, please complete the following questionnaire to determine the degree that you
agree with the assessment that the computer and network attack taxonomy is
satisfactory. Since a taxonomy approximates reality, it may be limited in some of the
characteristics.
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Please answer the questions and short answers below. If you select Disagree or
Strongly Disagree for questions 1 through 6, please provide an explanation.
Date:
Primary Air Force Specialty or corresponding job description (i.e. CommunicationsComputer Officer):
Question

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

1. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

□

D

D

D

D

□

D

D

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
2. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
EXHAUSTIVE.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
3. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
UNAMBIGUOUS.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
4. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
REPEATABLE.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
5. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
ACCEPTED.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
6. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
USEFUL.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:

Proceed to the next page.
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7. Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack
taxonomy that you observed.
Category

Area of Improvement

Attackers

Tools

Access

Results

Objectives

Stop.
Please return the questionnaire to richard.daiqle@afit.af.mil.
Thank you for your time and support.
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Appendix B -1997 Computer and Network Attack Questionnaire Summaries

This appendix contains the cumulative information obtained from the computer
and network attack questionnaire. Table 12 lists all the respondents' comments,
verbatim. Per the questionnaire's instructions, if the respondents selected Disagree or
Strongly Disagree to questions 1 through 6, this researcher requested comments
explaining their decision.
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Table 13 lists all the respondents' suggested areas of improvements for the taxonomy,
verbatim.
Table 12 -1997 Questionnaire Disagree and Strongly Disagree Comments
1. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.
• A hacker for example can do thing for more than one reason, i.e. for noteriety and
financial gain.
• As explicitly defined, I can see clear distinctions between them (e.g. terrorist vs. corp.
raider). However, nothing seems to preclude one attacker from "wearing 2 or more
hats." For example, and using Mr. Howard's definitions, a terrorist may perform some
"vandal"-ism (break in to computers to cause damage) for the express purpose of
supporting his political objectives. Related would be a Corporate Raider who, in order to
achieve financial gain (maybe win a lucrative contract) for his corporation, may hire a
Professional Criminal to break into a competitor's system and cause damage (act as a
"vandal") so as to improve the corporation's position relative to the competitor. It seems
that either through employment of various tactics or enlistment of an intermediary an
attacker can function on/across multiple "levels" and break the exclusivity of this
taxonomy.
• For the "Attackers" category, there is (or can be) overlap between vandals and every
other groups except for spies (they don't want you to know they were there). For
example, a corporate raider can gain by damaging a competitors website - would that
be a corporate raider or a vandal? For the "Tools" category, there is overlap between
several tools. For example, a toolkit (or distributed tool) is made up of autonomous
agents and/or scripts or programs. There may also be overlap in the "Objectives"
category akin to that in the "Attackers" category.
2. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
EXHAUSTIVE.
• As described, this doesn't appear to account for attacks prosecuted as, or during, an act
of war. Where do military operations (for whatever National Objective) fit in? Also as
described, the ACCESS issue describes general points of system vulnerability; but fails
to addess other means of "unauthorized use/access" (e.g. social engineering) that can
defeat protected systems.
• Computers and Networks can be attacked by external means as well (microwave
pulses, etc). Isn't that another tool terrorists could sue to impact comm networks.
• Social engineering should be part of the "Tools" category.
• Unsure how Denial of Service types of attacks would fit in the Access category. Also
need a category for physical access.
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3. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
UNAMBIGUOUS.
• What if the financial gain of one company also causes damage? Under which one is it
catagorized then?
• Different people may classify differently because of the "mutually exclusive" problems
identified above.
• There might be existing toolkits that operate in a distributed fashion - so would it be
classified as under the "toolkit" category, or the "distributed tool" category?
4. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
REPEATABLE.
• What if the financial gain of one company also causes damage? Under which one is it
catagorized then?
• Don't know if it's repeatable. I'm a comm officer and the taxonomy seems logical
enough, but the common user may not come to the same conclusion. Perhaps this is a
test within itself.
• Since there is a problem with ambiguity, there would also be a problem with
repeatability.
The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
ACCEPTED.
• I don't agree with the term 'Accepted'. I believe it's acceptable, but using the word
accepted within your argument may assert a precedent that will later call the study into
question. Side note: I think you may gain some utility in breaking this questionnaire out
to test each of the categories.
The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
USEFUL.
• No comments.
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Table 13 -1997 Taxonomy Suggested Areas of Improvement
7. Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack taxonomy
that you observed.
Area of Improvement
Category
Attackers

•

•

•
•

•

•

Tools

•
•

•

•
•

•
•

Could also be "insiders", Users that accidentally cause damage to a
system through ignorance, or "script kiddies" that are not quite
hackers.
Needs to include the role of the warfighter. Again, the problem is of
exclusivity since we (as a warfighter) may act to corrupt (e.g. for a
deception), steal (e.g. critical technologies or codes), DOS (extend an
adversay OODA loop and diminish positive control of its forces).
Another overlooked "attacker" is the activist-has political motivations
like a Terrorist but without the fear factor.
Might want to include dummies. Computer security should also limit
damage caused by authorized users making stupid decisions or taking
stupid actions.
I'm not sure how to solve the problem with vandals overlapping with
more than one group. Possibly break each group into benign and
malignant types. For example, hackers and crackers.
Need to look at the Nation/State IW aspect. Also some consideration
of inadvertent attacks by authorized insiders-a big problem in the Air
Force.
Could also add packet sniffer.
This is usually a multi-step process involving many tools. This model
would seem to indicate choosing one or another. The real world
doesn't work like that.
Social Engineering (SE) is a tool employed to gain unauthorized
access. It is also a point of vulnerability...I'm unsure how/where to
delineate SE.
Needs to acknowledge that sometimes (see "processes" comment
within the Access category below) use of tools are not necessary.
Ensure people understand that attackers are not limited to the tools
that line up with their respective blocks. All unauthorized personnel
make use of the same tools to achieve their different objectives.
Not mutually exclusive. Toolkit seems to be an 'All of the above'
category.
This category focused only on the technical aspects of computer and
network attack. There are many instances where people give out user
IDs and passwords to intruders so that no "tool" as defined in this
taxonomy is required.
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7. Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack taxonomy
that you observed.
Area of Improvement
Category
Access

Results

Objectives

Social Engineering is a significant point of vulnerability
As far as "processes" go, I think this is too limited. It refers to
"protected" resources. What about when information is errantly or
inadvertently "made available." It may be that an "attacker" doesn't
even have to conduct an attack to get information, if that's what is
desired....
The access referred to here is unclear. Vulnerability seems to be how
the attacker gets in, while unathorized access and use describes what
the attacker is doing, and processes, files, and data in transit refer to
what the attacker is after. The AF categorizes "Access" into root and
user-level access.
I would expect this to address the fact that DoS attacks can be
successful without ever gaining "access" to resources under control of
the target.
Another possible result is Financial Loss, or loss of customer goodwill.
An attacker may "posturing" (e.g. creating backdoors, positioning tools,
etc.) himself to take some later action without conducting one of the
listed "results."
The view presented in the taxonomy is one of immediacy. It needs to
consider the concept of investment as a potential desire or action of an
attacker to achieve long-term gain.
Consider adding permanent destruction of information. I know it can
fall under corruption, but I think there is a significant difference
between manipulating data and destroying data. A manipulation can
force a competitor's hand, whereas destruction can result in a closing
or worse.
Theft of service and denial of service are very similar. By stealing
bandwidth, even if you do not affect the users on line, other users may
not be able to gain access. This is hard to ascertain.
Seems like there are more objectives than just these few.
Again, not mutaully exclusive in this area.
Distinction is made between personal and corporate financial gain in
defining an attacker; why not make the distinction regarding the
intended objective.
Including the warfighter as an attacker will impact this area. Politial
gain could be adapted to include National Objectives, but it seems
other changes would also be required.
For the Dummies category, the objective would most likely be
authorized use.
Again, the comments from the "Attacker" category apply here.
May also consider attacks with no well thought-out motivation,
objectives may be entertainment or education, even "none".

79

Appendix C -1998 Computer and Network Taxonomy Questionnaire
This questionnaire supports the thesis, An Analysis of the Computer and Network
Attack Taxonomy, written by Captain Richard C. Daigle, graduate student in the
Information Resource Management degree program. Read the background information
on Figure 1 - Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy and then proceed to the
questionnaire. Your contributions will be used to analyze the satisfactory usefulness of
the computer and network attack taxonomy, as defined by Mr. John D. Howard. Please
return the questionnaire to richard.daigle@afit.af.mil.
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(Howard and Longstaff, 1998: 16)
Figure 1 - Computer and Network Attack Taxonomy
Howard developed this taxonomy as part of a collaborative effort with Security
and Networking Research Group at the Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore CA,
and the CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA. The
taxonomy and resulting work was published in the 1998 Sandia National Laboratories
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report, A Command Language for Computer Security Incidents by John D. Howard and
Thomas A. Longstaff, posted on the CERT®/CC web site at
http://www.cert.org/research/taxonomy_988667.pdf.
The following background information comes from a compilation of extracts from
Howard's research:
This taxonomy depicts a simplification of the path an attacker must take in order to
accomplish the attacker's objectives. To be successful, an attacker must find one
or more paths that can be connected, perhaps simultaneously.
Howard defined computer security as:
Computer security is preventing attackers from achieving objectives
through unauthorized access or unauthorized use of computers and
networks. (50)
As the formal definition of computer security presented indicates computer security
is preventing attackers from achieving objectives by making any complete
connections through the steps depicted. More specifically, computer security
efforts are aimed at the five blocks of the taxonomy.
A popular and simple taxonomy of computer and network security attacks is a list
of single, defined terms. Variations of this approach include lists of categories.
There are several problems that limit the usefulness of these approaches including
1) the terms not being mutually exclusive, 2) an exhaustive list being difficult to
develop and unmanageably long, 3) the definitions of individual terms being difficult
to agree on, and 4) there being no structure to the categories.
An alternate categorization method is to structure the categories into a matrix. The
procedure for classification using these taxonomies, however, is not unambiguous
when actual attacks are classified. In addition, the logic is not intuitive, and the
classifications are limited in their usefulness.
The taxonomy developed as part of this research does not attempt to enumerate
all computer security flaws, or to enumerate all possible methods of attack, but
rather to reorient the focus of the taxonomy toward a process, rather than a single
classification category.
The final taxonomy presented was developed from the specific definition of
computer security.. .from the criticisms of the current taxonomies, and from a
process or operational viewpoint. From this viewpoint, an attacker on computers or
networks attempts to link to ultimate objectives or motivations. This link is
established through an operational sequence of tools, access, and results that
connects these attackers to their objectives...
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The taxonomy "does not attempt to enumerate all computer security flaws, or to
enumerate all possible methods of attack, but rather attempts to provide a broad,
inclusive framework. The intention was to reorient the focus of the taxonomy
toward a process, rather than a single classification category, in order to provide
both an adequate classification scheme for Internet attacks, and also a taxonomy
that would aid in thinking about computer and network security".
Extracted from An Analysis of Security Incidents on the Internet 1989 - 1995, by
John D. Howard, http://www.cert.org/research/JHThesis/Start.html.
The following information further helps you understand the computer and network attack
taxonomy:
Overarching Groupings

1. Incident - a group of attacks that can be distinguished from other attacks because of
the distinctiveness of the attackers, attacks, objectives, sites, and timing.
2. Attack(s) - a series of steps taken by an attacker to achieve an unauthorized result.
3. Event - an action directed at a target which is intended to result in a change of state
(status) of the target.

ATTACKERS
1. Attacker represents an individual who attempts one or more attacks in order to
achieve an objective.
a. Hackers - break into computers primarily for the challenge and status of
obtaining access.
b. Spies - break into computers primarily for information which can be used for
political gain.
c. Terrorists - break into computers primarily to cause fear which will aid in
achieving political gain.
d. Corporate Raiders - employees of one company break into computers of
competitors for financial gain.
e. Professional Criminals - break into computers for personal financial gain (not
as a corporate raider).
f. Vandals - break into computers primarily to cause damage.
g. Voyeurs - attackers who attack computers for the thrill of obtaining sensitive
information.
TOOLS
2. Tools used to exploit computer and network vulnerabilities.
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a. Physical Attack - a means of physically stealing or damaging a computer,
network, its components, or its supporting systems (such as air conditioning,
electric power, etc.).
b. Information Exchange - a means of obtaining information either from other
attackers (such as through an electronic bulletin board), or from the people
being attacked (commonly called social engineering).
c. User Command - a means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering commands
to a process through direct user input at the process interface.
d. Script or Program - a means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering
commands to a process through the execution of a file of commands (script)
or a program at the process interface.
e. Autonomous Agent - a means of exploiting a vulnerability by using a program,
or program fragment, which operates independently from the user.
f. Toolkit - the attacker uses a software package which contains scripts,
programs, or autonomous agents that exploit vulnerabilities.
g. Distributed Tool - a tool that can be distributed to multiple hosts, which can
then be coordinated to anonymously perform an attack on the target host
simultaneously after some time delay.
h. Data Tap - a means of monitoring the electromagnetic radiation emanating
from a computer or network using an external device.
VULNERABILITY
3. A weakness in a system allowing unauthorized action
a. Design - a vulnerability inherent in the design or specification of hardware or
software whereby even a perfect implementation will result in a vulnerability.
b. Implementation - a vulnerability resulting from an error made in the software
or hardware implementation of a satisfactory design.
c. Configuration - a vulnerability resulting from an error in the configuration of a
system, such as having system accounts with default passwords, having
"world write" permission for new files, or having vulnerable services enabled.
ACTION
4. A weakness in a system allowing unauthorized action
a. Probe - access a target in order to determine its characteristics.
b. Scan - access a set of targets sequentially in order to identify which targets
have a specific Characteristic.
c. Flood - access a target repeatedly in order to overload the target's capacity.
d. Authenticate - present an identity of someone to a process and, if required,
verify that identity, in Order to access a target.
e. Bypass - avoid a process by using an alternative method to access a target.
f. Spoof - masquerade by assuming the appearance of a different entity in
network communications.
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g. Read - obtain the content of data in a storage device, or other data medium.
h. Copy - reproduce a target leaving the original target unchanged.
i. Steal - take possession of a target without leaving a copy in the original
location,
j. Modify - change the content or characteristics of a target,
k. Delete - remove a target, or render it irretrievable.
TARGET

H

A computer or network logical entity (account, process, or data) or physical entity,
(component, computer, network or internetwork).
a. Account - a domain of user access on a computer or network which is
controlled according to a record of information which contains the user's
account name, password and use restrictions.
b. Process - a program in execution, consisting of the executable program, the
program's data and stack, its program counter, stack pointer and other
registers, and all other information needed to execute the program.
c. Data - representations of facts, concepts, or instructions in a manner suitable
for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic
means. Data can be in the form of files in a computer's volatile or nonvolatile memory, or in a data storage device, or in the form of data in transit
across a transmission medium.
d. Component - one of the parts that make up a computer or network.
e. Computer - a device that consists of one or more associated processing
units and peripheral units, that is controlled by internally stored programs,
and that can perform substantial computations, including numerous arithmetic
operations, or logic operations, without human intervention during execution.
Note: may be stand alone, or may consist of several interconnected units.
f. Network - an interconnected or interrelated group of host computers,
switching elements, and interconnecting branches.
q. Internetwork - a network of networks.
UNAUTHORIZED RESULT
6. Unauthorized results are an unauthorized consequence of an event.
a. Increased Access - an unauthorized increase in the domain of access on a
computer or network.
b. Disclosure of Information - the dissemination of information to anyone who is
not authorized to access that information.
c. Corruption of Information - unauthorized alteration of data on a computer or
network.
d. Denial of Service - the intentional degradation or blocking of computer or
network resources.
e. Theft of Resources - the unauthorized use of computer or network resources.
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OBJECTIVES
7. The purpose or end goal of an incident.
a.
b.
c.
d.

Challenge, Status, Thrill - objective of hackers and voyeurs
Political Gain - objective of spies and terrorists
Financial Gain - objective of corporate raiders and professional criminals
Damage - objective of vandals

According to Howard, a satisfactory taxonomy "should have classification
categories with the following characteristics" (53):
a. Mutually exclusive - classifying in one category excludes all others because
categories do not overlap
b. Exhaustive - taken together, the categories include all possibilities
c. Unambiguous - clear and precise so that classification is not uncertain,
regardless of who is classifying
d. Repeatable - repeated applications result in the same classification,
regardless of who is classifying
e. Accepted - logical and intuitive so that they could become generally approved
f. Useful - can be used to gain insight into the field of inquiry. (53)
Therefore, based upon the five category descriptions and the satisfactory taxonomy
definition, please complete the following questionnaire to determine the degree that you
agree with the assessment that the computer and network attack taxonomy is
satisfactory. Since a taxonomy approximates reality, it may be limited in some of the
characteristics.
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Please answer the questions and short answers below. If you select Disagree or
Strongly Disagree for questions 1 through 6, please provide an explanation.
•

Date:
Primary Air Force Specialty or corresponding job description (i.e. CommunicationsComputer Officer):
Question

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

1. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

□

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
2. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
EXHAUSTIVE.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
3. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
UNAMBIGUOUS.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
4. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
REPEATABLE.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
5. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
ACCEPTED.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:
6. The computer and network attack taxonomy
meets the described characteristics of
USEFUL.

D

If Disagree or Strongly Disagree selected, insert comments:

Proceed to the next page.
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7. Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack
taxonomy that you observed.
Category

Area of Improvement

Attackers
Tools
Vulnerability
Action
Target
Unauthorized
Result
Objectives

Stop.
Please return the questionnaire to richard.daiqle@afit.af.mil.
Thank you for your time and support.
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Appendix D -1998 Computer and Network Attack Questionnaire Summaries
This appendix contains the cumulative information obtained from the 1998
computer and network attack questionnaire. Table 14 lists all the respondents'
comments, verbatim. Per the questionnaire's instructions, if the respondents selected
Disagree or Strongly Disagree to questions 1 through 6, this researcher requested
comments explaining their decision. Table 14 lists all the respondents' suggested areas
of improvements for the taxonomy, verbatim.
Table 14 -1998 Questionnaire Disagree and Strongly Disagree Comments
1. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.
• Internal users "attack" networks more often than external attackers, sometimes they
do it unknowingly sometimes with ulterior motives. I guess it depends on what your
definition of an attack is. Perhaps your taxonomy should include such a definition.
• Objectives are not neccesarily mutually exclusive. An atacker for example could be
doing it for finacial gain and noteriety,
2. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
EXHAUSTIVE.
• While overarching, nothing can possibly include ALL possibilities
3. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
UNAMBIGUOUS.
• Some actions specifically can be classified differently by different people,
depending on their own interpretation
4. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
REPEATABLE.
• See previous comments on differing interpretations
5. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
ACCEPTED.
• No comments.
6. The computer and network attack taxonomy meets the described characteristics of
USEFUL.
No comments.
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Table 15 -1998 Taxonomy Suggested Areas of Improvement
7. Please suggest any areas of improvement to the computer and network attack taxonomy
that you observed.
Area of Improvement
Category
Attackers

•
•
•
•

Tools

•
•

•

Much better than the last. I believe all bases are covered and they
all make sense.
Good Coverage - Skill level of the attacker would not be important
to the process
Since there is a distinctin between hackers and crackers, it might
warrant mentioning.
Note that there are fine lines for which an attacker can move into
another name, for instance, voyeurs, if they do more than watch,
miqht become one of the other classifications.
I still see some overlap between toolkit and the Tools that make up
the toolkit.
Data Tap can also include monitoring electrical usage of key
components to determine complexity of access codes. Also known
as Differential Power Analysis (Denning 1999)
"Process interface" - does this mean the computer directly? I'm
assuming it means something more broad so that "computer" isn't a
narrowing of scope.
Complete as is
Worth mentioning that "configuration" is attributable to the human
factor. Specifically, a system can have superior design and
implementation, but still be vulnerable because humans used
incorrect configuration - the only as strong as the weakest link
concept.

Vulnerability

•
•

Action

•
•
•

Target

•
•

Good
No changes needed
As noted, differing interpretations can lead to different action
classifications. Detailed explanations for each action area can
alleviate this problem.
Good
No changes needed

Unauthorized
Result

•
•

Good
No changes needed

Objectives

•
•
•

Good
No changes needed
These are not neccesarily mutually exclusive objectives.
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Appendix E - AFCERT Base Incident Response Checklist
If you suspect or know a system is compromised, please follow these procedures and
complete the form.
DON'T
• Finger attempt to access the source, or contact the source.
• Change the system files on the suspected/compromised system.
• Connect to the system over the network.
DO
• Unplug the machine from the network (if mission will allow).
• Log-on as root at the console and do a complete dump of the system (i.e., on
Unix, dd if="harddrive"of="tapedrive" bks=32k). Make sure you don't alter
any files on the system.
• Place the dump in a secure location.
• Place the suspected/compromised system in a secure place. (Limit access to the
system).
• Complete the following and contact the AFCERT at DSN 969-3156 or 1-800-8510187:
1. Report Originator Information:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

Name:
Rank:
Unit/Base:
DSN Phone Number:
Commercial Phone Number:
Position (system administrator, security manager, etc.):
MAJCOM:
E-Mail Address:
Message Address:
Mailing Address:

2. Target Information (if additional targets use separate sheet):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Network Domain Name (i.e., afcert.csap.af.mil):
IP Address (i.e., 132.28.145.43):
Computer Model (i.e., Sun SparcStation 10):
Operating System/Version (SUN-OS 4.1.6 etc.):
Security Mode of Operation (dedicated, system high, multilevel etc.):
Security Classification (i.e., SBU, secret, etc.):
Network/System Mission (i.e., administration, C2, communications, logistics,
Domain Name Server, etc.):
h. Network Structure/Type:
i. How Detected:
j. Impact on Mission (if compromised):
k. AIS Auditing:
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3. Attack Session Information (correlates with the target information):
(if known, include; if unknown, leave blank and don't access system files)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Date/dates of the Session:
Time:
Attack Method:
Success:
Account (Include host name if available):
First Layer Point of Origin IP:

4. Brief Scenario (Description of incident):
5. Countermeasure(s) Installed (e.g., patches, top wrappers, shadow passwords, etc.)
a. Name and date installed (if known, include; if unknown, leave blank and don't
access system files):
6. Notification Checklist (Indicate full name and rank, date, and time notified):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Computer System Security Officer (CSSO):
Operation Commander:
Designated Approving Authority (DAA):
Wing IP Office:
MAJCOM IP Office:
Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team:
(AFCERT, Checklist, 2000)
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Appendix F - AFCERT Malicious Logic Report Format

1. Reporting period:
2. Reporting Information:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Name/Rank:
Unit:
Base:
MAJCOM:

3. Malicious logic name (complete section 3a-e for each malicious logic detect d):
a. Number of infections detected by system mission criticality and point of detection:
TYPE SYSTEM*
After

# Detected Before Infection

# Detected
Infection

Mission Critical
Mission Essential
Mission Impaired
Non-Mission Essential
*Criticality IAW AFMAN 10-401
b. Number of work hours expended:
c. Operating system and version:
d. List standard system(s) affected (if applicable, i.e., GCCS, CAMS, FAMS):
e. Source of infection, if known:
AF software
COTS or outside source
Personal disks
Downloaded files
(AFCERT, Report, 2000; AFSSI 5021, 1996:15)
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Appendix G - ACERT Intrusion Submission Form

Intrusion Response Checklist
If you suspect or know a system is compromised, please follow these procedures and
complete the form.
DON'T
Finger attempt to access the source, or contact the source.
Change the system files on the suspected/compromised system.
Connect to the system over the network.
DO
Unplug the machine from the network (if mission will allow).
Log-on as root at the console and do a complete dump of the system
Make sure you don't alter any files on the system.
Place the dump in a secure location.
Place the suspected/compromised system in a secure place. (Limit access to the
system).
Complete the following and contact the ACERT at DSN 235-1113 or 1-703-7061113:
Email the ACERT at: acert@liwa.belvoir.army.mil
Or contact RCERT CONUS at DSN 879-2482 or (520) 538-2482:
Email the RCERT at: rcert-conus@rcertc.army.mil
1. Report Originator Information: Date:
a. Name
c. Unit/Post

b. Rank/Grade
d. DSN Phone Number

e. Commercial Phone Number
f. Position (system administrator, security manager, etc.)
g. MACOM

h. e-mail Address

i. Message Address
j. Mailing Address
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2. Target Information (if additional targets use separate sheet):
a. Network Domain & Host Name (i.e., liwa.belvoir.army.mil)
b. IP Address (i.e., 132.28.145.43)
Mask

Subnet

c. Computer Model (i.e., Sun SPARCstation
10)
d. Operating System/Version (SUN-OS 4.1.6 etc.)
e. Security Mode of Operation (dedicated, system high, multilevel etc.)
f. Security Classification (i.e., SBU, secret, etc.)
g. Network/System Mission (i.e., administration, C2, communications, logistics, Domain
Name Server, etc.)
h. Network Structure/Type
i. How
Detected
j. Impact on Mission (if compromised)
k. AIS
Auditing

Yes

I. Firewall
No
m. IDS

No

Type_

Yes
Type_
Yes

No
n. System Status

Type_
On-line

Off-line

3. Attack Session Information (correlates with the target information):
(if known, include; if unknown, leave blank and don't access system files)
a. Date/dates and time of the Session Start:

Stop

b. Attack Method_
c. Source IP
d. Source Host & Netblock name if available) Host
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Netblock.

e. Organization: (i.e.. fl3m, TheK)_
f. Country:

4. Countermeasure(s) Installed (e.g., patches, TCP wrappers, shadow passwords,
etc.)
a. Name and date installed:
(if known, include; if unknown, leave blank and don't access system files)
5. Brief Scenario (Description of incident)
(ACERT, Intrusion, 2001)
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Appendix H - ACERT Virus Reporting Form

1. PERSON REPORTING INFORMATION:
Name:

Title (ISSO/IAM/etc):

Phone: DSN

or Commercial

E-mail:

Agency, Location, and MACOM:

2. ANTI-VIRUS SOFTWARE PRODUCT INFORMATION (AT THE TIME OF INFECTION):
AV Product Used (Norton/McAfee):
AV Product Version and Build #:

Scan Engine:
Virus Definition Date:

3. VIRUS INFORMATION:
Name of Virus:
Name of Infected File(s):
Date Detected:

Date Cleaned:

Detected at (Firewall, Exchange Server, Gateway, Desktop, etc.):

4. COMPUTER INFORMATION:
Operating System with Version and SP #s:
Additional Software with Ver/SP #s (Exchange Server, etc.):

IP Address of Infected System(s):
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5. DAMAGE REPORT:
Source of Infection (Check as Applicable):
E-mail (Originator's E-mail Address Download (URL ■
Other
(
Total # of Files Infected:
Total # of Computers Infected:

Type of Network (NIPRNET, SIPRNET, etc.):
Impact of Virus on Mission:
Total Loss

Partial Loss

Recovered Fully

Lost Manhours:
6. SYNOPSIS (Provide a description of the incident, to include identification of root cause(s) of infection
and corrective steps taken):

Submit to the ACERT (virus@liwa.belvoir.army.mil) with a "cc" to your supporting
RCERT.
(ACERT, Virus, 2001)
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Appendix I - CERT®/CC Incident Reporting Form

Your contact and organizational information
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Name...:
Organization name...:
Sector type (such as banking, education, energy or public safety)...:
Email address...:
Telephone number...:
Other...:
Affected Machine(s)
(duplicate for each host)

7. Hostname and IP...:
8. Timezone...:
9. Purpose or function of the host (please be as specific as possible)...:
Source(s) of the Attack
(duplicate for each host)
10. Hostname or IP...:
11. Timezone...:
12. Been in contact?...:
13. Estimated cost of handling incident (if known)...:
14. Description of the incident (include dates, methods of Intrusion, intruder tools
involved, software versions and patch levels, intruder tool output, details of
vulnerabilities exploited, source of attack, or any other relevant information)...:
(CERT®/CC, Form, 2000)
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Appendix J - DOP CERT Incident Reporting Form
DOD CERTDOD CERT
Incident Reporting Form
This form meets the initial reporting requirements outlined in CJCSI 6510.01 B, Change
1, to report computer/network events. Please use the virus reporting form on the DOD
CERT home page to submit detailed virus reports. Keep in mind that the security
classification of your incident is dependent on the classification of the system affected. If
you are unable to email this form, you may send it by FAX to 703-607-4009 (DSN: 3274009).
Report Classification (e.g., For Official Use Only)
Warning: This is an UNCLASSIFIED system. Enter Only Unclassified Information.
Use SIPRNet to report classified incidents.

From:
To:_
Date/Time of Report:
Type of Incident:
Root Level
Name of Asset:
Mission Impact:

(Date & Time(ZULU) of Report (e.g. dd/mm/yyyy/hhmmZ))
(Probe Scan DNS Denial of Service User level Access
Access Malicious Logic)
Machine Name

Details of Incident: (See Reporting Guidelines for more detail information.)
Who:_
What:_
Server

IP Address of Source (e.g. xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx)
Web Server DNS Server File Server Mail Server Multi-Function

Router Firewall Workstation Machine Function
Date & Time(ZULU) of Incident (e.g. dd/mm/yyyy/hhmmZ)
When:_
IP Address of Destination (e.g. xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx)
Where:
Why:_
Action Taken:
Contact Information
Coordination:

Reporting Classification (e.g. For Official Use Only)
Warning Reminder: This is an UNCLASSIFIED system.
Enter Only Unclassified Information.
(Department of Defense, 2001)
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Appendix K - FeDCIRC Reporting Form
version 4.3.6
October 1999
Federal Computer Incident Response Capability
(FedCIRC)
Incident Reporting Form
FedCIRC has developed the following form in an effort to gather incident information. If
you believe you are involved in an incident, we would appreciate your completing the
form below. If you do not believe you are involved in an incident, but have a question,
send email to:
fedcirc@fedcirc.gov
Note that our policy is to keep any information specific to your site confidential unless we
receive your permission to release that information.
Return this form to:
fedcirc@fedcirc.gov
If you are unable to email this form, please send it by FAX. The FedCIRC FAX number
is:

+1 412 268 6989

Your contact information
name
:
email address...:
telephone number:
other
:
Affected Machine(s)
(duplicate for each host)
hostname and IP.:
timezone
:
Source(s) of the Attack
(duplicate for each host)
hostname or IP..:
timezone
:
been in contact?:
Description of the incident
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(Include dates, methods of intrusion, intruder tools involved, software versions and
patch levels, intruder tool output, details of vulnerabilities exploited, source of attack, or
any other relevant information.)
(FedCirc, 2001)
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Appendix L - NAVC1RT Incident Reporting Form

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Incident date
Physical location of the system attacked
How was the attack identified
How access was obtained
Vulnerability exploited
Actions attempted during session
Highest classification of information involved
Evaluation of attack success
Damage or effects resulting from attack
Hardware Configuration
Operating System
Security Software installed
Origination point of incident
Indication of additional activity
IP address
Names used
Mission of system attacked (e.g. administration, command and control, message
handling, etc.)
Point of contact (e.g. name, phone number, e-mail address)
Additional information
Viruses: Those known viruses with countermeasures available in the NAVCIRT
tool-kit should be logged and reported to FLTINFOWARCEN on a monthly basis.
Only those viruses not known or without an available countermeasure will be
reported [...].
(Department of the Navy, 1998)

102

Appendix M - Recommended Standard Information Collection Form
*PAGE 1 OF 2*
ORIGINATOR INFORMATION
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

DATE OF REPORT:
TIME (ZULU/GMT):
REPORTERS NAME:
ORGANIZATION NAME:
LOCATION COUNTRY:
LOCATION CITY:
LOCATION STATE/PROVINCE:
POSTAL MAILING ADDRESS:
PHONE:
EMAIL:
WEBSITE:
ADDITION INFORMATION YOU DEEM IMPORTANT:
AFFECTED SYSTEM(S) INFORMATION

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

DATE OF ATTACK:
TIME (ZULU/GMT):
HOST NAME (LIST ALL):
NETWORK DOMAIN NAME (TOP.MID.DNS):
IP ADDRESS (XXX.XX.XXX):
COMPUTER MODEL NAMES:
OPERATING SYSTEMA/ERSION:
SECURITY MODE OF OPERATION:
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION YOU DEEM IMPORTANT:
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*PAGE 2 OF 2*
ATTACK/INCIDENT INFORMATION
COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY.
THE MORE INFOMRATION, THE BETTER.
PLEASE EXPLAIN "OTHER" SELECTION FULLY.
1

SELECT ALL

5

ATTACKER
THAT APPLY
CORPORATE RAIDER
HACKER
PROFESSIONAL CRIMINAL
SPIES
TERRORIST
VANDALS
VOYEURS
OTHER

TARGET

SELECT ALL
THAT APPLY

ACCOUNT
COMPONENT
COMPUTER
DATA
INTERNETWORK
NETWORK
PROCESS
OTHER

SELECT ALL
2
THAT APPLY
TOOL
AUTONOMOUS AGENT
DATA TAP
DISTRIBUTED TOOL
INFORMATION EXCHANGE
PHYSICAL ATTACK
SCRIPT OR PROGRAM
TOOLKIT
USER COMMAND
OTHER

SELECT ALL
6
THAT APPLY
UNAUTHORIZED RESULT
CORRUPTION OF INFORMATION
DENIAL OF SERVICE
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
INCREASED ACCESS
THEFT OF SERVICE
OTHER

SELECT ALL
3
THAT APPLY
VULNERABILITY
CONFIGURATION
DESIGN
IMPLEMENTATION
OTHER

SELECT ALL
7
THAT APPLY
OBJECTIVES
CHALLENGE, STATUS, THRILL
DAMAGE
FINANCIAL GAIN
POLITICAL GAIN
OTHER

SELECT ALL
4
THAT APPLY
ACTION
AUTHENTICATE
BYPASS
COPYj
DELETE
FLOOD
MODIFY
PROBE
READ
SCAN
SPOOF
"
STEAL
OTHER
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